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 [*947]   
One of the most significant contributions of the law and economics literature has been the analysis of legislative 
acts as rent-seeking activity, with corresponding winners and losers. n1 A major insight from this literature relates to 
our understanding of the competitive effects of regulation. Regulatory activity, by Congress, the executive, and even the 
judiciary, affects markets in non-trivial ways. Some examples are fairly obvious, as when Congress enacts a tariff on 
imported goods, n2 or when Congress subsidizes farm products. n3 In a case of tariffs on imports, Congress is guarding 
domestic producers against foreign competition. n4 In the case of subsidies, Congress is reducing the costs of 
production of a particular sector of the economy and shifting  [*948]  those costs to a different sector. n5 
A voluminous literature has developed applying these economic insights. n6 Rarely, however, have the effects of 
regulation on members of the same industries been studied. This gap is understandable. First, it will be difficult for 
Congress to single out a firm within an industry for special treatment in any legislative act. Principles of evenhanded 
governance require that similar firms operate within the same regulatory environment. Differential regulation presents 
the flip side of subsidies. Those whom the government regulates the least may stand a better shot in the marketplace. 
Less efficient firms may benefit. Second, and perhaps more importantly, industry interests tend to be homogeneous, so 
that a regulatory framework that helps (or hurts) one member has the same effect on all the firms within the industry. n7 
The express package delivery industry (express industry) presents us with a unique research opportunity. n8 
Probably due to historical happenstance, individual firms in the express industry operate under different regulatory 
regimes in the area of labor law. Congress has regulated the largest, the Postal Service, under the Postal Reorganization 
Act (PRA); n9 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has asserted jurisdiction over the next largest, United Parcel 
Service (UPS), and a number of others under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); n10 and then Federal Express 
and several others are regulated instead under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). n11 Indeed, airline employees of UPS and 
Airborne Express are regulated under the RLA even though most of the companies’ other employees fall under the 
NLRA. 
The application of the three different labor relations regulatory regimes to the firms in the express delivery industry 
has important implications regarding the ability of these firms to compete in the delivery of their services. The three 
regulatory  [*949]  regimes impose differential costs upon the firms, potentially skewing market competition. 
Employees’ right to strike, the scope of collective bargaining, and the prospects of costly litigation differ across the 
industry. Firms operating under one regime consequently may gain a competitive advantage over another. For example, 
some companies within an industry might be advantaged because their ground employees may only organize on a 
system-wide basis when other companies are vulnerable to being organized on a piece-by-piece basis. n12 In virtually 
all other industries, application of labor laws to a particular firm has no competitive impact because the same regulatory 
structure governs all firms within the industry. 
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By analyzing the cost implications of the three labor law regimes, this Article seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of the economic effects of regulation. Part I briefly addresses the structure of the express industry to 
demonstrate the similarity of services provided by the firms. n13 
Part II sketches the contrasting labor-relations regimes that govern the industry. n14 The regulatory differences 
stem from historical and conceptual premises governing labor relations in the trucking and airline industries that no 
longer are relevant in today’s integrated market. Yet, fundamental aspects of each regulatory regime differ. The right to 
strike, for instance, constitutes a more central tenet of the NLRA than the RLA, and the right is not protected at all 
under the PRA. On the other hand, an employer’s duty to bargain is far more limited under the NLRA and PRA than 
under the RLA. 
Part III assesses the comparative costs imposed by the different labor relations regimes. n15 The cost implications 
of strikes loom as one major distinction. Costs arising due to an expanded bargaining obligation form another. The 
incidence of litigation also varies, as does the cost of administering labor relations under the three regimes. 
Part IV discusses the implications of this analysis. n16 Two major implications are developed in this section. The 
first implication is with regard to the regulation of the express delivery industry. n17  [*950]  In the United States, labor 
relations legislation is a sensitive issue to address from a political standpoint. n18 Although the President and Congress 
have frequently been willing to intervene on an ad hoc basis in “emergency strikes,” neither of these political branches 
of government has shown any readiness to undertake fundamental reform of the basic regulatory frameworks through 
permanent legislation. The probability of moving part or all of the express package industry out from under either of the 
major private-sector statutes into the framework of the PRA - designed for a public sector entity - is low. Moreover, the 
likelihood that Congress will create a new labor relations structure solely for the express industry is minimal. Due to the 
substantially different costs imposed by the labor relations regimes, however, the government may be persuaded to 
equalize regulatory burdens. Only by leveling the playing field can the government pave the way for an efficient express 
package delivery market. 
The second implication is broader and it relates to the regulatory process that has dominated our experience in the 
administrative agency era. n19 The basic approach to regulation in the United States has been to adopt one regulatory 
framework and apply it to a particular problem regardless of the myriad of circumstances experienced by the regulated 
subjects. This one-size-fits-all approach is clearly a dominant feature of our regulatory framework. The comparison of 
the three labor regulatory regimes raises an interesting counterexample to the traditional model of regulation. Instead of 
adopting a one-size-fits-all model, could a regulatory model be conceptualized where a menu of regulatory options is 
made available to the target population? Under such an approach those affected by the regulatory regime will choose 
among the various regulatory options and adopt those that better fit their particular situations. Part IV.B develops the 
basic parameters of this proposal. n20 The Article ends with a brief conclusion. 
 [*951]   
I 
The Express Industry 
The express industry encompasses the delivery of time sensitive parcels. n21 There are seven national firms in the 
industry: the United States Postal Service (USPS), n22 United Parcel Service (UPS), n23 Federal Express, n24 Airborne 
Express, n25 Purolator, n26 DHL n27 and Emery Worldwide. n28 The express industry has evolved over the course of 
the last three decades from primarily surface transportation systems to integrated air and ground networks. The 
proportion of air to ground transportation and parcel and document delivery varies among the firms, but the 
transportation mode utilized is secondary to the certainty of delivery. The firms’ principal focus on express package 
delivery justifies analyzing the firms as a group. The basic service provided by these firms is very similar in that all 
involve a combination of air and ground transportation. n29 
The major difference between the firms in the industry is the proportion of air to ground transportation upon which 
each rely. UPS, for example, relies primarily on ground transportation. n30 Distinctively, Emery Worldwide appears to 
be structured in a more balanced manner regarding the proportion of air to ground  [*952]  transportation. n31 Federal 
Express, on the other hand, has relied on air transportation as its main operational approach. n32 
Although firms in the express industry vary in terms of the proportion of air to ground transport, n33 they all 
provide the same critical function of express package delivery. n34 Participating firms view themselves as part of a 
distinct industry, and an entire literature has been spawned monitoring the vicissitude of express package delivery. n35 
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II 
Contrasting the Different Regulatory Regimes 
Three major statutes govern the industry: the NLRA, n36 the RLA, n37 and the PRA. n38 These statutes share 
many common characteristics, but fundamental differences exist in the protection afforded employees’ rights to 
organize, in the scope of collective bargaining, and in their dispute resolution systems. n39 This Section compares the 
three labor law regimes across these various dimensions. 
A. A Brief Introduction to the Historical Origins of the RLA, NLRA and PRA 
The three labor relations statutes applicable to the express delivery industry were enacted at very different time 
periods. Not surprisingly, they adopt markedly different philosophies regarding the regulation of the labor process. 
 [*953]  In the railroad industry, collective bargaining has been an accepted practice since the 1880s. n40 
Government intervention was the exception rather than the rule and occurred on an ad hoc basis. n41 Thus, until World 
War I, the focus of labor law in the railroad industry was with means to promote voluntary dispute settlement, as for 
example, the use of alternative dispute resolution processes such as fact-finding, mediation, and arbitration. n42 
This pattern continued after the war. Management and labor continued to voluntarily bargain collectively over 
grievances and revisions in pay rates and working rules without a legal framework. Work stoppages were possible 
constrained only by the parties’ bargaining power. 
It was against this background that Congress enacted the RLA in 1926. The RLA’s legislative history reveals 
Congress’ intent of ratifying the existing private “treaty.” n43 There were very few enforceable provisions, relying 
instead on the expectation that “most of the provisions of this bill are to be enforced by the power of persuasion, either 
exercised by the parties themselves or by the Government board of mediation representing the public interest.” n44 
Thus, the RLA was conceptualized in a framework of voluntarism, and against a background of industry practice that 
accepted a role for union and collective bargaining. 
The NLRA evolved in a substantially different manner. Unlike the pre-RLA period, voluntarism - the approach that 
relied on minimum government intervention - was not working well in the rest of the industrial sector. n45 It was 
apparent to Congress  [*954]  that without the force of law behind it, collective bargaining was not likely to develop as 
the primary mechanism of industrial governance. n46 
Congress first attempted to reach its goal of promoting collective bargaining by legislative means through the 
enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. n47 The NIRA failed to provide adequate 
machinery capable of confronting an openly hostile management sector. n48 In enacting the NLRA, Congress thus was 
primarily concerned with the enforcement aspects of the Act. Voluntarism, and reliance on alternative dispute resolution 
processes were all rejected, and in their place, the focus was placed on the use of administrative machinery and 
traditional legal processes to implement policy. n49 
The current legal framework governing labor relations in the USPS is the creature of the 1970 strike by postal 
employees. n50 The postal strike of 1970 was the first truly national federal strike. n51 The strike began in March 1970 
when postal employees in New York City initiated a job action, which quickly spread across the country. n52 
Negotiations between the Secretary of Labor and the postal union failed to produce a settlement and eventually 200,000 
postal employees joined in the stoppage. n53 
Attempts by Congress to deal with labor strife in the postal service were significantly constrained by the 
circumstances of the moment. On the one hand, there existed intense public pressure to settle the strike by acquiescing 
to a statutory framework that would satisfy the concerns of labor. n54 On the other hand, the existing legal framework 
at the time constrained Congress’ ability to determine the subject of negotiations and to define the rights public 
employees could be granted. n55 
The result of this very political bargain was a statutory framework (the PRA) that embraces key aspects of both the 
NLRA and the RLA. The PRA adopts the administrative apparatus of  [*955]  the NLRA to protect employee concerted 
activity n56 and it incorporates the RLA’s promotion of mediation and arbitration to prevent strikes. n57 
B. Enforcement Machinery 
One of the key differences between the statutory regimes is the structure of the administrative machinery that has 
developed over the years to enforce the statutes. n58 The NLRA provides for the creation of an administrative agency, 
4 
the NLRB, which traditionally has broad authority to elaborate the policy embodied in the NLRA and to flesh out the 
details of labor policy. n59 The NLRB operates in a sense as Congress’ partner in fleshing out the details of the Act. 
n60 The result is an adjudicative system that generates a substantial amount of litigation. n61 
The RLA administrative machinery is substantially different. n62 Unlike the NLRB, the RLA’s enforcing agency, 
the National Mediation Board (NMB) is not involved in articulating the policy of the RLA, or in interpreting statutory 
provisions. n63 
This distinction is best illustrated in the enforcement mechanisms used under the statutes. The NLRA defines a 
series of unfair labor practices (ULPs). n64 ULPs constitute conduct considered illegal because of their effect on the 
substantive rights of employees to self-organize, “to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” n65 The NLRA safeguards these rights by prohibiting certain  [*956]  
employer actions. n66 The NLRA also outlaws a number of union ULPs. n67 Developing the content and extent of 
these ULPs has been the role of the NLRB, and through it, the NLRB has played a significant role in the development 
of labor policy. n68 No equivalent mechanism exists under the RLA. n69 As a consequence, under the RLA courts 
rather than an agency interpret the governing statute, and there is no administrative adjudication. 
Thus, as compared to the NLRA, the RLA is unlikely to generate as much litigation given the limited role that the 
agency plays under the statutory scheme. This in turn should result in greater consistency across time in the 
development of the RLA. 
C. Organizing Rights 
One important measure for comparing the statutes is their approach to the regulation of organizing rights. 
Organizing rights refer to those provisions in the statute that regulate the rights of employees to choose whether or not 
to be represented by a labor  [*957]  organization, as well as the regulations regarding the union election and 
certification processes. Various commentators have noted that the NLRA and the RLA differ markedly in terms of their 
philosophy towards representational issues. n70 Generally, the representation process under the RLA appears skewed 
toward union representation as a premise for collective bargaining and labor peace. n71 The RLA reduces the 
possibility of representation disputes by acknowledging employees’ absolute right to be represented, and by forbidding 
employer interference in the process. n72 
One of the major objectives of the RLA is to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees 
and to provide for the complete independence of carriers and employees in self-organization. n73 The RLA provides 
that representatives shall be designated by the respective parties without interference, influence or coercion by the other. 
n74 
The NLRA provides a similar set of protections. The NLRA provides that employees “shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, ... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
activities.” n75 
The language of both acts, therefore, appears to be fairly similar. In their application, however, the statutes differ in 
one significant aspect ... organizing rights under the RLA have been more intensively protected than under the NLRA. 
n76 The RLA’s commitment to the protection of organizing rights is evidenced by the availability under the RLA of 
injunctive relief for the enforcement of organizing rights and the assertiveness and creativity of the NMB in various 
other aspects of the organizing process. Those two aspects are discussed in turn. 
 [*958]  Under the RLA, parties rely on the injunctive power of the federal district courts to enforce statutory rights. 
n77 Those rights include the prohibitions against carrier interference with the organizational rights of employees. n78 
For example, terminating an employee for union activity is an interference with such rights. It has been argued that the 
availability of this relatively quick injunctive relief “has had such a strong deterrent effect on carrier conduct that 
discriminatory discharges to discourage unionization rarely occur under the RLA.” n79 
Although a similar mechanism is available under the NLRA, n80 courts have been generally reluctant to use 
injunctions as a way of protecting organizing rights. n81 Instead, the administrative process of the NLRA has been 
utilized, resulting, in what some argue is a lack of protection for workers attempting to organize collectively. n82 
An important, yet overlooked, aspect of the differences between the RLA and the NLRA is the manner in which the 
enforcing agencies regulate the union certification and election processes. Both statutes provide some latitude to the 
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enforcing agencies to enforce the organizing rights of employees. The extent to which the enforcing agency utilizes this 
flexibility significantly affects the organizing outcomes under both statutes. Again, significant differences are apparent 
when comparing the NLRB and the NMB. 
Somewhat uncharacteristically, the NMB has been much more aggressive in conducting representation elections, as 
well as in developing creative approaches to remedy violations of the statute. For example, the NMB has refused to give 
employees an opportunity to vote “no union.” n83 Employees who oppose union representation can express their 
position only by refraining from voting. n84 The NMB justifies its election on the grounds that such procedure permits 
employees to secure some form of  [*959]  representation. n85 
The NMB has also been innovative in their philosophy towards modifications of ballots to remedy violations of the 
election process. When the NMB finds carrier interference, it employs a variety of special ballots and notices intended 
to eliminate the taint of interference on the employees’ freedom of choice of representative. n86 The NMB’s methods of 
determining the employees’ choice of representative vary on a continuum determined by the extent of the carrier 
interference found. n87 
For example, in response to conduct by employers such as soliciting employees to turn in their ballots to an 
employer’s official, increasing wages before the election period, and polling of employees, the NMB has ordered a re-
run election using a “Yes” or “No” ballot with no write-in space provided. n88 Unlike the regular election procedure, 
under this remedial ballot - known as the Laker ballot - the majority of votes cast determine the outcome of the election. 
In cases involving more egregious conduct by the employer, the NMB has employed procedures designed to 
provide increasing safeguards for employees’ freedom of choice of their representative. n89 The so-called Key ballot is 
designed with the purpose of certifying the union, unless a majority of eligible voters return votes opposing union 
representation. n90 
The NLRB has been substantially less aggressive in the use of alternative ballot procedures as a mechanism to 
respond to employers’  [*960]  interference with the election process. The NLRB does not use any alternative ballots, 
limiting its remedial powers primarily to re-running elections and in extreme cases (when employers’ unfair labor 
practices are thought to preclude the holding of an election), to issuing bargaining orders. 
Curiously, the NMB has taken one position regarding organizing rights that commentators have considered to be 
less protective of employee rights. Paragraph nine of the RLA requires the NMB to investigate representation disputes 
and to determine, by secret ballot or other means, which organization or individual, if any, represents a “craft or class.” 
n91 From its inception, the NMB has indicated a strong preference for carrier-wide units of a craft or class. n92 
Although the NMB has modified its original position pertaining to bargaining units, n93 it continues for the most 
part to insist on certification of bargaining representatives according to historic craft or class lines. This practice 
continues, despite the changing face of the transportation industry through new technology, new competition, and 
alteration of industry structure, n94 and notwithstanding the NMB’s clear authority to “regroup, amalgamate or splinter 
historic bargaining groups ...” as conditions change. n95 
The NLRA provides for the organization of employees in “a unit appropriate” for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. n96 Unlike the NMB, the NLRB has substantial discretion to determine the “appropriateness” of a unit. 
Under the NLRA, labor  [*961]  and management can agree to the bargaining unit, although the NLRB is not obligated 
to ratify any such agreement it believes does not provide for bargaining through an appropriate unit for such purposes. 
n97 Thus, the NLRA’s policy regarding bargaining unit determinations has resulted, for the most part, in a practice of 
certifying smaller bargaining units, or at least units in which employees share a common set of experiences (either 
geographical location, or in terms of skills and functions). 
In short, regarding organizing rights, it appears that except for its position regarding the definition of bargaining 
units, the RLA facilitates the process of forming unions. n98 
D. Collective Bargaining 
As in the case of representational issues, the RLA and NLRA statutory language regarding collective bargaining 
rights is substantially similar. Paragraph one of the RLA establishes “the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and 
employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and 
working conditions, and to settle all disputes” peacefully. n99 Similarly, the NLRA imposes a duty to bargain, which 
means that parties are required to meet and confer in good faith in an attempt to negotiate a collective bargaining 
6 
agreement. n100 An employer is required to refrain from unilaterally altering those wages, terms and working 
conditions that are considered “subjects of mandatory bargaining” until impasse has been reached. n101 A union must 
refrain from striking if there is a contractual no-strike clause in effect and the collective  [*962]  bargaining agreement 
has not expired. n102 In practice, however, the two statutes differ markedly in one key aspect: the scope of the duty of 
bargaining. n103 
The NLRA imposes on employers and unions a duty to bargain over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment.” n104 Courts, however, have not been willing to require employers to bargain over all issues that fall 
within the statutory language. n105 Rather, they have developed a distinction between mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, which are within the duty to bargain, and permissive subjects of bargaining, which are not. n106 The 
Supreme Court has defined mandatory subjects as to exclude certain areas that fall within the exclusive control of 
management. n107 The Court’s reasoning suggests that many other strategic-level corporate decisions are not subject to 
mandatory bargaining. n108 
Under the RLA, in contrast, the scope of the duty to bargain has been viewed traditionally as extremely broad. 
Courts have  [*963]  generally held that the RLA’s duty to bargain includes bargaining over all issues that come within 
the statutory phrase, “rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.” n109 Courts interpreting this provision have not 
incorporated into the RLA the NLRA’s mandatory-permissive issues distinction. n110 According to the Supreme Court, 
“the trend of legislation affecting railroads and railroad employees has been to broaden, not narrow, the scope of 
subjects about which workers and railroads may or must negotiate and bargain collectively.” n111 
Thus, for example in interpreting the duty to bargain under the RLA, courts have required the employer to bargain 
over decisions such as leasing the employer’s facilities, n112 as well as the closing and moving of operations out of the 
country. n113 
E. Dispute Resolution 
In comparing the two statutes on the dispute resolution dimension, it is helpful to distinguish between the statute’s 
approach to the resolution of grievances on the one hand, and the resolution of work stoppages on the other. 
 [*964]   
1. Resolution of Grievances 
For the railroad industry, the RLA establishes an industry-wide grievance apparatus for the resolution of minor 
disputes. n114 This structure, which has developed over the years, provides the contracting parties with various venues 
to pursue the resolution of grievances. n115 Originally the RLA created the National Railroad Adjustment Board and 
gave it jurisdiction over all “minor disputes” involving railroad carriers. n116 
In subsequent amendments to the RLA, and in order to alleviate caseload problems, Congress established the 
Special Boards of Adjustment (SBAs), and the Public Law Boards (PLBs). n117 These boards provide alternative fora 
for the resolution of minor disputes. PLBs and SBAs are different from the NRAB in that their procedures are 
somewhat more flexible, and are of a more voluntary nature. n118 
While different in detail, these venues are similar in some important respects. First, not only is the existence of the 
boards statutorily mandated but also their structure and their jurisdiction  [*965]  are statutorily provided. Second, they 
are all publicly financed, substantially reducing the costs to the parties utilizing their services. 
The procedure for the airline industry is different. When the airline industry was brought under the RLA, Congress 
empowered the NMB to establish a National Air Transport Adjustment Board, along the lines of the National Railway 
Adjustment Board. n119 Anticipating a possible delay by the NMB in establishing this new board, Congress imposed 
an obligation to establish individual carrier system boards of adjustment. n120 However, Congress left it to the 
contracting parties to decide the structure as well as the authority granted to the boards. Thus, in the airline industry the 
RLA leaves the parties with broad flexibility to determine, through the collective bargaining process, the makeup of 
boards and the procedural powers granted to them. n121 
This distinction has had a significant impact on the performance of the various mechanisms under the RLA for the 
resolution of minor disputes. The caseload of the NRAB has been characterized as exorbitant. n122 The caseloads of the 
SBAs and the PLBs have been notoriously high. For example, in fiscal year 1995, PLBs closed 3,474 cases, leaving 
6,409 cases pending. n123 In the same year, SBAs closed 1,514 cases and left 1,317 cases pending. n124 Commentators 
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have noted that such a caseload exists in no other industry. n125 Besides the quantity, it can take several years to decide 
cases, thus exacerbating the problem. n126 
In contrast to the structure used in the railroad industry, the boards of adjustment in the airline industry are financed 
by the  [*966]  contracting parties. As a result, there is no evidence of any significant arbitration backlogs or delays. 
n127 “One need look no further than the airlines to find sufficient proof that the cure for the case load deluge in railroad 
grievances can be obtained by forcing the parties to pay for their own excessive use of the process.” n128 
The NLRA is completely silent on the issue of the resolution of grievances, leaving it to the parties themselves to 
devise the proper structure. Grievance procedures exist in almost every union contract covered by the NLRA. n129 
Grievance procedures tend to have the same key features across workplaces, including a definition that limits grievances 
to claims of contract violations, an emphasis on written processing, a series of ascending steps up to the terminal stage 
(usually arbitration) and explicit time limits for each stage. n130 
The grievance arbitration process has become firmly embedded in the union-management relationship. n131 
Although there is substantial variation across industries on the number of grievances filed per year, grievance filing is a 
permanent component  [*967]  of the industrial relations process under the NLRA. n132 Grievance procedures under 
the NLRA appear to operate in an efficient manner. Most grievances are resolved during the early stages of the 
grievance process, within two months of the filing date. n133 These resolutions usually are achieved without outside 
assistance, so for the typical grievance the processing costs are relatively low. The efficiency with which most grievance 
procedures dispose of grievances at early stages means that only a small fraction of grievances are arbitrated. Several 
studies have shown that the arbitration rate in most workplaces is quite low, averaging about ten percent. n134 
2. Resolution of Work Stoppages 
Economic action is an integral part of our national labor policy, and both statutes reflect this philosophy. The right 
to strike is protected implicitly under the RLA, and explicitly by the NLRA. The two Acts differ significantly, however, 
in the extent to which labor and management may control when the right of economic action can be exercised. 
Among the major policy objectives of the RLA are the avoidance of any interruption to commerce and the 
provision of a system for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working 
conditions. n135 In accordance with these purposes, the RLA mandates that carriers and employees exert every 
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions and to settle 
all disputes in order to avoid any interruption to commerce. n136 
Under the RLA, the parties may not exercise economic action until the “major dispute” procedures of the Act have 
been exhausted. n137 These procedures include negotiation, mediation, and at the option of the President, an emergency 
board. n138 These procedures also provide that a party wishing to change rates of pay, rules or working conditions must 
give thirty days written notice  [*968]  to parties interested in such changes. n139 Following this notice, bargaining can 
commence. n140 If bargaining fails to resolve the dispute, either party may invoke the services of the NMB. n141 The 
NMB assigns a mediator to meet with the parties and attempt to induce an agreement. n142 If mediation fails, the NMB 
must attempt to obtain the parties’ consent to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. n143 
If the parties reject the offer of arbitration, and if the NMB believes that the dispute threatens “substantially to 
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation 
service,” the NMB must notify the President, who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the 
dispute. n144 After the Presidential Emergency Board (PEB) report is submitted, a thirty-day cooling-off period begins 
during which the parties are required to further maintain the status quo. n145 After the thirty-day period, either party 
may resort to self-help: management may implement its unilateral changes to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, 
and unions may strike. 
Most important to the major dispute resolution procedures is that during the bargaining and mediation process both 
parties are subject to a status quo obligation - no changes to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions are permitted. 
Furthermore, federal courts have the power under the RLA to enjoin status quo violations. n146 
Out of more than thirteen thousand mediation disputes between  [*969]  1934 and 1999, emergency boards have 
been appointed 234 times - 201 in the railroad industry and thirty-three in the airline industry. n147 On average, boards 
were used a little over four times each year from 1925 through the 1960s. n148 There was a small decline in the use of 
emergency boards during the 1960s and 1970s to an average of three emergency boards per year. n149 A sharper 
decline occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. n150 Emergency boards were appointed in the railroad industry an average of 
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only twice per year, while in the airline industry only one emergency board has been appointed in the last two decades. 
n151 
Unlike the RLA, which postpones the right of economic action, the NLRA allows economic pressure except as 
regulated by section 13 of the Act, or through a collective bargaining agreement. n152 The statutory requirements are 
fairly minimal, primarily involving notice requirements. n153 In lieu of any statutory  [*970]  constraints, the parties 
themselves are encouraged to adopt provisions, through collective bargaining, that are intended to regulate the 
occurrence of economic action. For example, collective bargaining agreements usually contain clauses negotiated by the 
parties, limiting their ability to engage in economic action. n154 Thus, under the NLRA the parties have a greater 
opportunity, as compared to the RLA, to affect the timing of economic action. 
Similar to the RLA, the NLRA provides for a special procedure in cases involving national emergency disputes. 
Under the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, a multi-step process is established involving presidential and judicial 
intervention. n155 First, if the President decides that a threatened or actual work stoppage affects “an entire or 
substantial part” of an industry or will “imperil the national health or safety,” n156 he may appoint a board of inquiry to 
conduct hearings into the dispute. n157 The board will issue a report, at which time the President can direct the 
Attorney General to petition a federal judge to enjoin the strike. n158 If the injunction is granted, the parties to the 
dispute must attempt to settle their differences with the help of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the 
President must reconvene the board of inquiry. If there is not settlement at the end of a sixty-day period, the board of 
inquiry must issue another report to the president on the current positions of the parties. n159 Economic action is further 
delayed until the NLRB certifies that the employees have rejected, by secret ballot, the employer’s last offer, whereupon 
the injunction is vacated. n160 The President may then recommend a resolution of the dispute to Congress. n161 
 [*971]  The procedure for emergency disputes under the NLRA involves not only a decision by the executive, but 
also the “approval” of the judicial branch. Case law regarding judicial review of presidential decisions under the NLRA 
emergency procedure is unsettled, however. In Steelworkers v. United States, n162 the Supreme Court confronted a 
challenge to an injunction granted by the lower court, following President Truman’s decision to invoke the emergency 
procedure of the NLRA. In responding to a union challenge that the emergency procedures were unconstitutional, the 
Court acknowledged that no injunction could issue under the Taft-Hartley Act unless the district court finds that a strike 
or lockout meets the statutory conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national health or safety. n163 The 
Court found the injunction justified on the ground that the strike’s effect on specific defense projects imperiled the 
national safety. n164 In so ruling, the Court found it unnecessary to decide between the government’s claim that the 
statutory term “national health” comprehends general economic well-being of the country, and the union’s claim that 
only the physical health of the citizenry was intended. n165 
In only two other instances have federal courts faced requests by the federal government regarding the NLRA’s 
emergency disputes procedures. In United States v. International Longshoremen Ass’n, n166 a district court denied the 
government’s request for an emergency strike injunction for the first time since Congress enacted the Act. n167 Finally, 
in an unreported 1978 decision, a district court refused to renew a temporary restraining order initially issued under the 
Taft-Hartley emergency dispute procedures  [*972]  because the statutory standard was not met. n168 
These three decisions have produced some degree of uncertainty regarding the standard under which a petition for 
an injunction will be reviewed. The President needs to consider the likelihood that a district court judge might refuse to 
grant an injunction. This uncertainty may explain the reduced frequency with which the President has invoked the 
emergency procedures in recent years. 
Similar to the experience of the RLA, the NLRA national emergency provisions were used more intensively in the 
first few decades after their enactment. In the first twenty-two years following their enactment, the emergency 
provisions were used twenty-nine times, and never in that period did even two years pass without their initiation. n169 
Since 1970, however, they have been used only six times. The last of these episodes involved the 1977-1978 coal strike, 
in which a federal court refused to grant an emergency dispute injunction on the ground that the strike had not been 
shown to have resulted in “irreparable harm to the national health or safety.” More recently, President Clinton 
considered but decided against using the emergency dispute procedure in the strike by the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters against United Parcel Service. Similarly, various parties sought presidential intervention during the 1994 
Major League Baseball strike. 
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F. The Special Case of the Postal Reorganization Act 
The PRA is the outcome of the 1970 strike by postal employees. n170 Under the PRA, postal employees were 
given the right to determine compensation, hours, benefits and terms and conditions of employment through collective 
bargaining. n171 Grievances and adverse actions under the agreement are subject to negotiations. n172 The NLRB 
alone supervises representation elections and enforces the unfair labor practice provisions contained in the NLRA, as 
well as determines the appropriate bargaining unit under the same criteria applied in the private sector. n173 
Supervisory  [*973]  and managerial personnel are excluded from the collective bargaining process but are assured pay 
differentials over their subordinates. n174 Their associations are provided with consultation and participation rights in 
the planning and development of their pay policies and fringe benefits. 
Given the prohibitions against strikes by federal employees, the PRA provides for alternative methods to resolve 
bargaining impasses. n175 Similar to the NLRA, the PRA requires the party desiring to terminate or modify the 
agreement to give written notice to the other party no less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the agreement, or 
from the time it is proposed to make the termination or modification. n176 The party serving the notice must also notify 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) of the existence of the dispute, if within forty-five days of 
serving notice the parties have failed to reach an agreement. n177 
The PRA then adopts procedures somewhat similar to those of the RLA, by providing fact-finding procedures by 
the FMCS whenever the parties fail to reach an agreement or to adopt a procedure for binding resolution by the 
expiration of the agreement. n178 The fact-finding panel is required to issue a report, with or without recommendations. 
n179 Finally, the PRA goes further than either the NLRA or RLA, by providing for binding arbitration if the bargaining 
impasse persists for 180 days from the start of negotiations. n180 
Postal employees have been relatively successful at negotiating improvements in wages and working conditions. 
n181 Between 1970 and 1977, they increased their salaries by ninety-four percent, compared with forty-seven percent 
for other federal salaries. n182 The Postal Service and the unions have proceeded to  [*974]  arbitration on several 
occasions. n183 For example, in 1990 the National Association of Letter Carriers (Letter Carriers) and the American 
Postal Workers union, in joint negotiations, rejected management demands for a two-tier wage schedule. n184 An 
arbitration panel awarded a higher wage package than that proposed by the employer, but the decision also established a 
schedule of wages for new hires significantly below existing entry levels. n185 Thus, both the employer and the unions 
were forced to accept compromises. n186 More recently, in 1998, bargaining between the Letter Carriers and USPS 
broke down when four weeks of mediation between the parties failed to produce a new agreement. n187 A three-
member arbitration panel convened to resolve the dispute issued an award in September 1999. n188 
The PRA therefore embraces key aspects of both the NLRA and the RLA: it adopts the administrative apparatus of 
the NLRA to protect employee concerted activity; and it incorporates the RLA’s promotion of mediation and arbitration 
to prevent strikes. 
III 
Assessing the Regulatory Costs of the Three Regimes 
 
A. Introduction 
The prior section reveals that there exists considerable variation in regulatory approaches under the NLRA, the 
RLA, and the PRA. Although the three schemes share much in common, their distinctive histories and purposes have 
bred substantial variation in employer obligations and employee rights as well. This section analyzes those differences 
in an effort to assess employers’ comparative costs of proceeding under the three labor-management frameworks, and 
thus evaluate the potential competitive advantages and barriers that the regulatory regimes  [*975]  imposed on the 
members of the express package delivery industry. 
The analysis focuses on three aspects of the respective regulatory systems: litigation, administration of labor 
management relations, and the regulation of work stoppages. Although there is no accepted way of characterizing the 
costs imposed by a labor-relations regime, these three types of costs arguably constitute the most important categories. 
B. Litigation Costs 
One initial point of comparison among the three statutes relates to the amount of litigation that we should expect to 
be generated under each statutory regime. Different amounts of litigation should generate different costs - I refer to 
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these as litigation costs. Litigation costs include expenses associated with resolution of grievances as well as court 
litigation. Litigation costs can be difficult to quantify. Company lawyers do not always keep accurate time sheets, and 
assessing the cost due to time lost for company personnel to prepare testimony or appear in proceedings is daunting. 
Nonetheless, even based on payments to outside counsel, litigation costs for a large company reach millions of dollars 
each year. 
Three aspects of litigation costs must be considered: (1) whether parties are as likely to raise disputes under the 
different legal regimes, (2) whether the different regulatory structures engender the same number of litigable issues, and 
(3) whether the costs of litigating such issues vary depending upon the particular regime. 
1. Culture 
In assessing the amount of litigation under the respective regimes, culture plays a surprisingly significant role. 
History and experience have encouraged a culture of mediation under the RLA. n189 In sharp contrast, the culture 
developed under the NLRA is based on confrontation. n190 Like the NLRA, the PRA developed in the context of an 
openly contentious relationship between postal workers and the USPS. n191 While aspects of this relationship continue 
to be less than cooperative, there has been  [*976]  marked improvement. n192 As a consequence of the different 
histories and practices, the incidence of litigation is likely to be greater under the NLRA than under the other two 
regimes. 
From its origins, the RLA has encouraged a culture of confrontation avoidance. As described earlier, collective 
bargaining in the railroad industry existed for at least forty years before the enactment of the Act. n193 Such bargaining 
occurred in an atmosphere where the resort to litigation was not considered a legitimate bargaining tool. 
The political evolution of the NLRA, however, was substantially different. n194 Congress enacted the NLRA 
against a background of contentious relations between labor and management. n195 Legislative attempts during the 
preceding years focused on the promotion of collective bargaining, but failed to overcome employers’ open defiance. 
n196 The drafting of the NLRA thus focused on enforcement, with concentration on administrative agency models and 
on traditional legal processes to implement policy. n197 
Congress developed the PRA in direct response to the postal workers strike of 1970. n198 Congress adopted a 
“quasi” private model, under which postal workers were to be treated as private sector employees under the NLRA, but 
without the ability to strike. n199 This structure appears to have resulted in a bi-modal culture. Regarding the 
organizing processes, the parties appear to have reached a culture of accommodation and cooperation. n200 This is 
probably due to the fact that in the public sector there has traditionally been less opposition from employers to union 
organizing. n201 Similarly, over the last decade, there has been a lot of experimentation in the postal sector with 
cooperative programs. n202 These experiments have proven to be very successful  [*977]  and have resulted in the 
development of a culture of trust among the parties. n203 On the other hand, there appears to be a heavy reliance on the 
use of the NLRB’s administrative machinery, which indicates a propensity to litigate at the administrative agency level. 
n204 Thus, the differing backgrounds of the three statutes likely set the framework for greater litigiousness under the 
NLRA than under the RLA and PRA. 
2. Structure of the Statutes 
The structure of the NLRA and RLA bears out what the historical settings suggest. For a number of reasons, the 
NLRA anticipates far greater litigation than under the other regime. 
First, Congress has included a list of unfair labor practices that can be raised by either employers or employees only 
under the NLRA and PRA. n205 For example, covered employees can assert that management has discriminated against 
them because of their concerted activity, n206 that management has formed or dominated an employee organization, 
n207 and that management has failed to bargain in good faith. n208 Employers in turn can charge that the union has 
coerced the rights of individual employees, n209 that the union has engaged in illegal economic activities, n210 and that 
the union has refused to fulfill its bargaining duties. n211 All such charges are to be lodged before the NLRB. n212 If 
the General Counsel finds probable cause, then a hearing is first held before an administrative law judge, with appeal 
rights then to the Board itself and subsequently to a federal court of appeals. n213 The process is cumbersome, 
expensive, and lengthy. 
In contrast, under the RLA, employers or employees with similar complaints generally only file grievances. Those 
grievances,  [*978]  as long as minor, are then subject to mediation. n214 No route to an administrative adjudicator or to 
the federal courts is contemplated. n215 The NMB has no quasi-judicial authority comparable to the unfair labor 
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practice jurisdiction of the NLRB. The structure of the statutes thus invites far greater incidence of litigation under the 
NLRA, and in this respect the PRA is structured similarly. 
Commentators concur that litigation of unfair labor practice issues is far more costly than resort to the grievance 
system. n216 Proceedings are more formalized in litigation, and the need for outside counsel is greater. n217 Witnesses 
must be prepared, and briefs must be written. n218 Moreover, with each additional stage in the administrative process, 
additional resources must be invested. n219 
Thus, under the NLRA litigation can occur through arbitration and ULP charges. Under the RLA, arbitration is the 
most likely avenue to challenge contract violations, and it is subject to fairly limited possibility of judicial review. 
One way of quantifying the effect of the different regulatory structures is by considering the length of time that it 
takes to resolve disputes under either regime. In terms of grievance arbitration, the average time in 1997 between the 
date the grievance was filed and the date of an award was about 311 days. n220 This delay will be experienced under 
both statutes, because grievance arbitration exists under both. However, under the NLRA, charging parties also have the 
avenue of filing an ULP. The protracted  [*979]  delay in utilizing the required stages for processing an unfair labor 
practice charge builds in another layer of costs. In 1997, the median period required to process a case from filing the 
charge to issuance of the Board’s order was 557 days. In addition, an enforcement action or an appeal of a Board’s order 
could take an additional one or two years. n221 
To be sure, employers might welcome these added costs because the NLRA’s cumbersome machinery for 
addressing organizational disputes permits widespread employer flouting or at least aggressive challenging of 
organization rights. n222 Delay diminishes the employees’ interest in efficacious resolution of organizational disputes. 
n223 Nonetheless, although at times employers might invite the greater costs of the multi-tiered review process under 
the NLRA, the fact remains that the statute itself envisions and embraces this costly process. 
Furthermore, not only are there more routes to litigation under the NLRA and PRA, but also there is greater 
likelihood that more disputes will arise because the two statutes rely on standard-like distinctions in setting the 
parameters for the employer-employee relationship. The contentiousness can be most clearly observed in two key areas: 
mandatory topics for bargaining, and organizational rights. 
By creating a distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, the NLRA and PRA engender 
considerable disputes that, until recently, have not been present under the RLA. The NLRA and PRA impose on 
employers and unions a duty to bargain over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” However, 
courts have limited the scope of this duty by developing a distinction between mandatory subjects of bargaining. For 
instance, in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, n224 the Supreme Court held that a company has no duty to 
bargain over a decision to close a part of its business. 
In contrast, under the RLA “the scope of bargainability is extremely broad.” n225 Courts have found that the RLA 
imposes a  [*980]  duty to bargain over all issues regarding “rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.” n226 This 
means that any issue affecting employees is subject to the bargaining and impasse procedures of section 6 if either side 
wishes to bargain. Because the scope of bargaining under the RLA has been interpreted to be plenary, the scope of the 
employer’s bargaining duty has not given rise to significant litigation. n227 The rule-like way in which the Court has 
construed the RLA minimizes the potential for disputes. 
In short, given the broad mandate in the RLA to bargain over every issue, litigation over the employer’s duty to 
bargain has been kept to a minimum. Accordingly, litigation costs under the RLA should be lower. 
In addition to the distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects, the NLRA and PRA contain 
more detailed procedures than the RLA for election unit definition and selection of the employee bargaining agent. n228 
This structure permits the NLRB more involvement in the regulation, investigation, and adjudication of recognition 
problems. n229 
No comparable process exists under the RLA. The duties and prohibitions that govern conduct under the RLA are 
enforced in the federal courts through suits brought directly by unions, employees, or carriers. n230 
Although this direct access to courts might at first blush appear to open the way to greater litigation, in practice the 
opposite has proven true. The availability of relatively quick injunctive relief - albeit pursuant to traditional equitable 
criteria applicable to most preliminary injunctions in the federal courts - has had such a strong deterrent effect on carrier 
conduct that discriminatory discharges to discourage unionization rarely occur under the RLA. 
12 
In a recent study, Professor Charles Morris evaluated the enforcement history of the regulatory regimes protecting 
employees’ organizational rights. n231 Professor Morris found that, since  [*981]  1926 when the RLA was enacted, 
there have been only fifteen published court cases involving issues of employee discharge for union activity. In fact, it 
has been more than ten years since a court decision has been published in this area. n232 
In contrast, litigation concerning employee discharge for organizing activity is a common occurrence under the 
NLRA. In 1997 alone there were a total of 13,127 charges involving section 8(a)(3). n233 It is generally accepted that 
most of the section 8(a)(3) incidents represent discharges that occurred in relation to union organizational activity. And, 
all such decisions are subject to judicial review. 
The RLA’s method in dealing with representation disputes is reinforced by the manner in which the RLA deals 
with the bargaining unit question. n234 The different approaches the three statutes use in defining the bargaining unit 
impose additional organization costs. Because of the rule-like nature of the RLA’s endorsement of craft-wide units, far 
fewer litigable questions arise. n235 
In comparison, the NLRA and the PRA provide for the organization of employees in “a unit appropriate” for the 
purposes of collective bargaining. n236 Unlike the NMB, the NLRB has substantial discretion to determine the 
“appropriateness” of a unit. n237 As discussed above, the primary focus in determining an appropriate bargaining unit 
under the NLRA and the PRA is that employees with a community of interest should be grouped together. n238 The 
NLRB inquires into a number of factors to test the community of interest: extent and type of union organization; 
bargaining history for the employees involved in the particular industry at issue; similarity of duties, skills, interests, 
and working conditions; structure of the company; and employee desires. n239 These fact-bound questions inject 
uncertainty into the bargaining unit determinations, and present additional fodder for litigation. 
Despite the high degree of unionization in both the railroad  [*982]  and airline industries, during the last three 
decades the NMB has decided only about fifty cases per year involving representation matters. n240 A majority of these 
cases have been in the airline industry, and have involved issues such as mergers and union raiding, as opposed to an 
active use of litigation as an organizing strategy. n241 
In contrast, the NLRA’s more context-specific “community of interest” standard reflects its statutory goal of 
championing employee voice. This approach, however, has generated some unanticipated consequences. In defining 
bargaining units so narrowly, the NLRB consciously or unconsciously has sown the seeds for greater litigation both 
because employees and employers will more likely disagree about the appropriate scope of the bargaining unit, and also 
because the majority favoring representation in each unit is more unstable. n242 
Although direct comparisons between industries covered by the RLA and the NLRA is difficult, the incidence of 
litigation in each group of industries can be roughly measured by comparing the number of representation cases per 
employee in industries covered under the RLA and the trucking industry covered under the NLRA. In 1980, for 
example, representation cases per employee in the trucking industry occurred at a rate of 7.1 cases per 10,000 
employees. n243 Under the RLA, the incidence was smaller, with a rate of 1.3 cases per 10,000 employees in 1978. 
n244 This trend appears to have continued in recent years. In 1997, representation cases per employee in the trucking 
industry was 2.3 cases per 10,000 employees, while the incidence under the RLA was less than one case (0.9) per 
10,000 employees. n245 
Despite the fact that the approach concerning bargaining units under the PRA is the same as that under the NLRA, 
the experience under the PRA parallels that under the RLA. For example, in 1997 no cases were filed concerning 
representation rights for postal workers. n246 This might be due to the fact that, as a heavily  [*983]  unionized 
industry, we should expect to see decreasing organizing activity. Alternatively, public sector employer resistance to 
organizing rights may have waned, minimizing conflict over representation rights. 
3. Administration of Grievance Machinery 
Despite the fact that more litigable issues arise under the NLRA than under the RLA, greater utilization of the 
grievance machinery under the RLA might blunt the cost savings from less litigation, particularly if one considers the 
possibility of a much more lengthy grievance process under the RLA. Thus, in comparing the two statutes is important 
to consider whether the greater accessibility to a grievance process (as is the case under the RLA) results in an 
“inefficient” increase in the use of the grievance process. There is evidence suggesting that the grievance machinery in 
the railroad industry is comparatively inefficient. Overall, however, there is little reason to conclude that the RLA’s 
preference for grievance resolution over litigation imposes enough costs on employers to come anywhere close to 
negating the RLA’s substantial advantage in minimizing litigation costs. 
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First, even though there are incentives for the parties to “abuse” the arbitration machinery, and the mechanisms to 
resolve grievances under the RLA (NRAB, SBAs, and PLBs) have been criticized for being inefficient, there is no 
indication, at least in recent years, that the rate of grievance filing under the RLA is significantly different than that of 
other industries. From 1993 to 1995, the number of grievances submitted to arbitration in the railroad industry average 
1.7, 1.99, and 2.02 per 100 employees, respectively. A study of 1980-1982 grievance activity across several private and 
public organizations found the comparable number to be 1.1 per 100 employees. n247 
Second, the grievance process utilized by the rail industry is entirely publicly financed. n248 This means that 
employers and unions do not bear the costs associated with establishing the dispute resolution machinery. n249 
 [*984]  Third, grievances under the RLA are rarely subject to judicial review. n250 Under the RLA arbitration 
boards have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes. n251 Awards are considered to be final and binding, 
leaving courts with only a limited role in the RLA arbitration process. n252 The RLA restricts judicial review to four 
narrow grounds: failure of the Board to comply with the requirements of the RLA, failure of the Board to conform or 
confine itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction, fraud or corruption by a member of the Board, and 
violations of public policy. n253 This limited role of judicial review, which parallels that adopted under the NLRA, 
should at least reduce the possible costs associated with grievance handling to the extent that it increases the finality of 
the grievance process. n254 
In sum, resolving grievances is far from cost free. Arguably, the costs incurred under the RLA in resolving 
grievances are smaller than the savings in litigation costs, particularly for non-unionized firms. Each grievance is far 
less expensive to resolve, and most are resolved short of arbitration. Moreover, the airline industry has streamlined the 
process more than in the railroad industry, heightening the disparity in costs between disputes in that industry and under 
the NLRA. 
C. Labor Relations Costs 
Another dimension over which the three regulatory regimes could be compared are the constraints placed on the 
ability of employers to operate their businesses. Two aspects of what I referred to as labor relations costs are 
considered: the effects of organizing rights and cost implications regarding bargaining duties. 
1. Organizational Issues 
As discussed earlier, the RLA, NLRA, and PRA differ in terms of their policies concerning organizing rights. Such 
differences  [*985]  result in a greater propensity to litigate organizational rights under the NLRA than under the RLA, 
thereby increasing litigation costs under the NLRA. Regulation regarding two other specific aspects of organizational 
rights - bargaining unit definition and election rules - may impose differential costs on employers depending on whether 
the RLA or NLRA applies. 
A key difference underlying both statutes with respect to organizational rights is the definition of the bargaining 
unit. Under the RLA, carrier-wide units of a craft or class have been found to be appropriate. This means that a union 
would have to obtain authorization cards from thirty-five percent of all employees in a “class” or “craft” (e.g., office 
and clerical employees) to obtain an election, and over fifty percent to obtain recognition. n255 Under the NLRA, a 
union can seek to represent employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, which has been normally defined as a single 
location unit. n256 
There are several cost implications because of this difference. First, a carrier-wide bargaining unit should make it, 
in theory, more difficult for unions to organize, because the union will have to get the support of a group of employees 
dispersed over a wide geographical area. n257 This should make it easier for an employer under the RLA to oppose 
unionization, and in that sense decrease the costs of opposing a labor organization’s organizing drive. 
In practice, however, it is not clear that these possible economies have been realized. For example, as noted earlier, 
union density rates under the RLA exceed those under the NLRA by a significant amount, and while union density in 
the private sector has generally been declining, in the industries covered by the RLA it has actually been increasing. 
n258 Similarly, the carrier-  [*986]  wide approach to the bargaining unit definition is accompanied, as discussed 
earlier, by the willingness of courts to issue injunctions against employers that interfere with the organizational rights of 
employees. n259 Another cost implication of the carrier-wide approach relates not to organizing per se, but to the effect 
that bargaining unit determination has on bargaining power. n260 While a larger, carrier-wide unit is more difficult to 
organize, once in place it could potentially exercise more bargaining power and be more difficult to decertify. Facing a 
carrier-wide unit, employers would lose some of their ability to isolate labor disputes to particular locales or 
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geographical area. n261 Further, a work stoppage in a carrier-wide unit could potentially signify the closing of 
operations for the whole enterprise. n262 
The rules regarding election issues also result in different costs under each of the three regimes. As described 
above, n263 the NMB has utilized different election procedures than has the NLRB, such as the different kind of 
election ballots (NMB’s ballot does not include a “no union”) and the NMB’s minimum voter participation 
requirements. The NLRB and the NMB have also differed in their philosophy towards modifications of ballots to 
remedy violations of the election process. n264 
The cost implications of the different approaches to elections are somewhat complex. On the one hand, the 
requirement that a majority of employees vote in favor of a union before granting recognition should make it less likely 
for a union to be certified under the RLA, since a no-show counts as a vote against the union. On the other hand the 
willingness of the NMB to use different ballots as an instrument to remedy employers’ attempts to interfere with their 
employees’ organizational rights appears to expand the set of protections available to employees as compared to the 
NLRA. 
In short, there is no a priori way to determine whether the RLA or NLRA imposes greater costs on employers due 
to their different election procedures. To some extent, at least, the RLA as a theoretical manner makes it more difficult 
for employees to  [*987]  elect union representation, but the NMB has stepped into the fray to ease such burdens. 
2. Bargaining Costs 
In opposition to the RLA’s advantage in minimizing litigation costs, bargaining costs under the RLA are steeper. 
The regulatory structure affects bargaining costs at two different levels. First, the RLA embraces a broader scope of 
bargaining, imposing on employers a duty to bargain over a broader set of issues as compared to the NLRA. Second, the 
RLA also provides incentives for protracted bargaining, which not only increases labor relations costs, but perhaps more 
importantly, serves to prevent the employer from efficiently adopting changes in the workplace. This section discusses 
these two issues. 
a. Effect on Managerial Prerogatives 
Although difficult to quantify, one of the most critical costs of any labor-management regulatory regime is the 
impact on employer flexibility. n265 A firm that cannot respond to market opportunities or changes cannot thrive. n266 
Competitive pressures, technological changes, and unexpected shifts in consumer demand all prompt the need for quick 
response. n267 Such responses take many forms, but may include abandoning certain product lines, closing outmoded 
plants, contracting out particular functions, or moving tasks offshore. n268 Although the gap between the NLRA and 
RLA in this respect may be narrowing - as we mentioned previously - the NLRA acknowledges and preserves firm 
flexibility to a far greater extent. 
Firms under the NLRA must bargain over mandatory subjects such as wages and hours, but not over managerial 
prerogatives. n269 The First National Maintenance Corp. n270 decision, and its progeny, carved out from the statutory 
obligation any bargaining proposal covering such strategic decisions as plant closing or building new plants overseas. 
Thus, unions may propose terms  [*988]  covering such items, but the employer need not agree to bargain over such 
proposals, and unions cannot take any protected legal action to protest the employer’s intransigence. 
In contrast, the RLA has not limited the employer’s duty to bargain. n271 Consequently, unions may propose 
limitations on the employer’s right to contract out, to hire foreign nationals, to close particular plants, and to bargain 
about the effects of such decisions. n272 In cases where the employer refuses to accede to the union’s demands, the 
dispute may ultimately be resolved by an arbitrator. The threat to employer autonomy is apparent. n273 
Moreover, an employer under the RLA may not take unilateral action on any major dispute during the pendency of 
a contract. n274 Thus, the employer must afford thirty days notice and bargain to impasse if the union challenges an 
economic decision as inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement during the period covered by the 
agreement. And, the employer at a minimum - as addressed earlier - must bargain over the effects of all such decisions. 
To a financially powerful company, the prospect of bargaining over employer prerogatives may not prove that 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, if the union has little strength, the potential for bargaining over employer 
prerogatives may pose little risk because the union’s threats are empty. n275 Unions will not be able to leverage that 
capacity to accomplish any significant material gains. Even a weak union, however, can interfere with management 
prerogatives through the ability under the RLA to delay the implementation of new policies. 
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Second, if a firm is in a relatively strong financial position, a company may predict that it will not need to revamp 
its operations so as to necessitate a quick sale or retooling of any of its plants. n276 Bargaining over employer 
prerogatives, and agreeing to limit the firm’s discretion, would therefore cause little harm. 
Third, a company may believe that it is in the position to allay  [*989]  the union’s interest on such strategic matters 
by offering significant material benefits in terms of enhanced pay or working conditions. n277 A collective bargaining 
agreement that insulates the company from union challenges over employer prerogatives may suffice. Even there, 
however, the company may have to promise more in the way of such benefits than it would have otherwise. 
Fourth, a company may be confident that the union will not be able to use the arbitral machinery under the Act to 
impact its strategic decisions materially. It may forecast that arbitrators or courts will be sympathetic to any carefully 
defended employer claim that dispatch was essential to protect itself in the marketplace. 
On balance, the dichotomy under the NLRA between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining advantages 
employers substantially. Most employers recognize that market conditions may suddenly alter to the point where they 
must change their operations quickly and significantly to avoid precipitous loss in market share. Firms may “pay” 
unions more to preserve their prerogatives under the RLA. Thus, because the RLA saps the employer’s ability to react 
quickly, employers should strongly prefer regulation under the NLRA in this respect. 
b. Protracted Bargaining 
Although the RLA, NLRA, and PRA all rely on collective bargaining as the core mechanism to regulate industrial 
conflict, the statutes are significantly different in terms of the incentives they create for parties to negotiate. The RLA 
embodies a conception of labor relations in which all existing conditions and practices are presumed to be the product of 
agreements between management and labor. n278 
The RLA requires parties to exhaust the Act’s dispute procedures before they exercise economic action. n279 Thus, 
the RLA forces labor and management to maintain the status quo for indeterminate periods regardless of their wishes. 
n280 The NMB controls the timing of strike threats by determining when the prospects for successful mediation have 
been exhausted. n281 The  [*990]  Board often uses this power to coordinate strike dates for different bargaining units, 
thus exercising significant power over bargaining structure. n282 
The RLA’s preference for the outcomes of collective bargaining in turn induces a “narcotic effect” which tends to 
protract collective bargaining negotiations even further. n283 If the parties are unable to settle a dispute by collective 
bargaining, either party may seek mediation by the NMB, or the Board “may proffer its services in case any labor 
emergency is found by it to exist at any time.” n284 Because the Act requires that the status quo remain in force until 
the Board releases the parties to unilateral action, the Board becomes involved in disputes that are not directly settled by 
the parties themselves and for which one of the parties finds soliciting intervention advantageous. n285 
In contrast to the RLA, the NLRA allows economic pressure to play a much larger role in the bargaining process. 
n286 Once parties have complied with their duty to bargain in good faith, a union is free to strike and an employer is 
free to institute unilateral changes in working conditions. n287 As described earlier, only under very specific conditions 
would the government intervene to delay or stop self-help actions by the parties to the collective bargaining process. 
n288 
Given that public employees do not enjoy a right to strike, the PRA provides for mediation and arbitration of 
interest disputes. n289 The PRA provides for fact-finding procedures by the FMCS whenever the parties fail to reach an 
agreement or to adopt a procedure for binding resolution by the expiration of the agreement. n290 The fact-finding 
panel is required to issue a report, with or without recommendations. n291 Finally, the PRA goes further than either the 
NLRA or RLA by providing for  [*991]  binding arbitration if the bargaining impasse persists for 180 days from the 
start of negotiations. n292 
In summary, parties negotiating under the RLA should expect to face longer and more frequent negotiations. 
Negotiations are prolonged as the parties go through mediation, the appointment of emergency boards, and the so-called 
“narcotic effect.” Knowing that mediation, and to some extent emergency boards, are fairly likely occurrences in the 
bargaining process, labor and management are less likely to take negotiations seriously until those steps have occurred. 
Moreover, labor and management under the RLA have less control over the negotiations, in terms of both their abilities 
to exert economic pressure on the opposing side and in the conduct of negotiations. The diminished ability to exert 
economic pressure results from the obligation to maintain the status quo during the course of negotiations and from the 
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greater level of government intervention through mediation. A similar problem could occur under the PRA. Reliance on 
fact-finding and arbitration appears to have become a common occurrence in postal negotiations under the PRA. 
These extra costs in terms of prolonged bargaining sessions and withheld desired changes in the workplace are 
possibly balanced by the major statutory achievement of the RLA and the PRA: a much greater certainty of labor peace. 
Thus, while the parties face some increasing costs under the RLA and the PRA, they also enjoy an increasing certainty 
that bargaining disputes will not be the subject of economic pressure. 
Whether this tradeoff is, ex ante, more beneficial to labor or management depends on a number of other factors 
such as bargaining power and business conditions. For example, an employer who is subject to significant cyclical 
variations in the demand for its product might find it extremely detrimental to maintain the status quo during the course 
of the various steps preceding the availability of self-help under the RLA. By the time negotiations end, the effect of the 
inability to respond to the change in demand might prove to be overly burdensome. On balance, therefore, protracted 
bargaining under the RLA likely disadvantages employers. 
 [*992]   
D. Regulation of Work Stoppages 
Strikes are far more likely under the NLRA than under the RLA. As discussed previously, the cooling off 
mechanisms imposed under the RLA, as well as the mediation mandate, makes the prospect of a strike far more remote. 
n293 Employees can strike only after exhausting the mediation provisions in the Act, and if a major dispute, only after 
the protracted and politically intense mechanism of the Presidential emergency boards have been utilized. n294 The 
constraints the RLA imposes on the ability to strike is likely to result in a much lower number of strikes in the railroad 
and airline industries as compared to industries covered under the NLRA. n295 While data on the railroad industry is 
unavailable, it is possible to compare strike activity in the airline industry, to strike activity in non-RLA industries. The 
data is suggestive of a much smaller level of strike activity in the airline industry under the RLA, even after considering 
the overall decline of strike activity throughout the economy. n296 There is no  [*993]  reason to think that figures for 
the railroad industry would be materially different. One reason for the lower level of activity may be the NMB’s greater 
involvement in interest disputes. The NMB’s virtually unreviewable discretion as to when a carrier and union should be 
“released” from mediation, and therefore entitled to strike, is virtually unreviewable by the courts. n297 This means that 
the NMB, encouraged by one or both parties, or merely informed by its own industrial relations expertise, can alter the 
bargaining process. 
Moreover, employers under the RLA, as discussed previously, are more likely to benefit from the emergency strike 
provisions. If the statutory threshold under the RLA is met, then mediation and government intervention diminish the 
prospect of a strike. n298 
Although from the employer’s perspective, the RLA appears to provide a broader protection against work 
stoppages, there is one potential wild card: work stoppages related to secondary pressure. Secondary pressure has been 
essentially prohibited under the NLRA, but largely is available to unions under the RLA. 
In Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, n299 the Supreme Court held that under 
the RLA once the parties have exhausted the procedures for major disputes resolution, they can “employ the full range 
of whatever peaceful economic  [*994]  power they can muster ... whether characterized as primary or secondary.” n300 
The Court has continued to adhere to this policy, rejecting carriers’ arguments that “allowing unions to resort to 
secondary activity is ... inconsistent with the major purpose of the RLA” to prevent strikes and interruptions to 
commerce. n301 According to the Court, although the primary goal of the RLA is to settle strikes and to avoid 
interruptions to commerce, there is no indication that Congress intended under the RLA to permit federal courts to 
enjoin secondary activity as a means towards that end. n302 Thus, the Court accordingly has allowed unions to picket 
the facilities of secondary carriers and to ask other carriers’ employees to withdraw from service. n303 The Court has 
treated secondary pressure in airline disputes under the same standard. n304 
Under the NLRA, a union having a dispute with an employer must confine its picketing activity to that particular 
employer. The NLRA prohibits unions from extending the labor dispute to other employers in the hope that pressuring 
them to cease dealing with the primary employer will facilitate achieving a victory against the primary employer. n305 
The provision against secondary activity is enforced both through injunctions and awards of monetary damages. n306 
The RLA thus provides unions with a larger set of weapons to exert economic pressure on the employer outside of 
the strike context. These weapons, however, are available to the union after a much longer period of negotiations. The 
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NLRA, on the other hand, allows the parties to resort to self-help much more quickly, but limits the kind of tools 
available to unions to exert pressure on the employer. In assessing the costs associated with these two regimes, 
employers should calculate the probability of a strike occurring under either regime, times the probability of harm 
caused by the union’s economic tools (NLRA - limited to primary activity; RLA - primary plus secondary activity). 
 [*995]   
E. Summary 
Regulatory structures impose costs, and the labor relations regimes covering the express industry are no exception. 
This section has identified the differing costs under the three regimes arising from litigation, the impact on 
administering labor-management relations, and the regulation of work stoppages. The chart below summarizes this 
discussion. 
Table 1 
Cost Comparison of the RLA, NLRA and PRA 
 
 RLA NLRA PRA 
Litigation Costs Low High Medium 
Likelihood of Employee Organization High Medium Medium 
Obstacles to Decertification High Medium High 
Impact on Management Prerogatives High Low Low 
Impact on Management Flexibility High Low Low 
Cost of Administering Statute Medium High High 
Risk of Government Meddling in Contract Negotiations High Low High 
Risk of Government Meddling in Contract Administration Medium High Low 
Risk of Strike Medium High Low 
 
Two aspects appear to make the PRA framework the most attractive for employers. First, employers are immunized 
from strikes, which in most employers’ eyes presents an advantage outweighing all other costs involved. The PRA 
substitutes binding interest arbitration for the right to strike. n307 Moreover, the PRA relieves employers of the duty to 
bargain over the direction and nature of an employer’s business. Companies preserve the flexibility to implement 
change immediately, avoiding the delay attendant upon protracted bargaining. 
The comparative cost analysis between the RLA and NLRA is closer, and companies might make different 
selections depending upon their position in the industry. The RLA promises greater  [*996]  security because employees 
can only take unilateral action after the lengthy mediation process of the Act has been exhausted. In addition, the RLA 
offers certain efficiencies by embracing craft-wide bargaining units. Finally, disputes under the Act are less likely to 
result in costly litigation. Requirements under the Act are formulated more as rules than standards, minimizing the 
opportunity for discord, which reinforces the culture of mediation underlying the Act. 
On the other hand, the security and efficiency come at a price - fewer managerial prerogatives are guaranteed. 
Firms under the RLA must bargain about all conceivable issues even if directly linked to business judgment. Nor can 
firms take unilateral steps to protect their financial interests in a rapidly changing economic environment. And, the 
heavy hand of agency mediators may constrain management even further. 
IV 
Implications 
The analysis presented so far has significant implications for the express package delivery industry, which as 
described earlier, n308 is directly affected by this state of affairs. The analysis also has broader implications. 
A. Implications for the Express Package Delivery Industry 
The analysis developed above raises serious concerns regarding the existing labor regulatory framework that 
applies to the express package delivery industry. Market competition within the same industry should not be skewed by 
differential costs imposed by labor-relations regimes. All firms should compete on as level a playing field as possible. 
Irrespective of the arguable advantages of one regime over the others, firms that provide the same service within the 
express industry should not be forced into different regulatory modes. 
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For instance, if strikes pose the greatest threat to market share, there is no sound reason to protect some competitors 
but not others from the risk. Governmental regulation otherwise would favor certain firms over others, compromising 
the norm of evenhanded regulation. Similarly, comparable burdens of litigation costs should be imposed on all 
competitors. And, if one firm  [*997]  must bargain over its exercises of managerial prerogatives, so should all. 
This distinction is of extreme importance to members of the express delivery industry. With the exception of the 
United States Postal Service, which clearly falls under the Postal Reorganization Act, n309 every major firm in the 
industry has litigated the coverage issue. n310 Invariably, the disputed issue has been whether a group of employees 
that seek union representation under the NLRA, are “employees” under the RLA and thus outside the coverage of the 
NLRA. n311 
These cases are troubling to industry members for a couple of reasons. First, it is hard to discern what standard the 
NMB is applying in these cases, n312 and when would the NLRB defer to  [*998]  the NMB’s judgment. n313 Second, 
to the extent that a legal standard can be defined, it imposes on industry members, as well as employees, a fairly 
inflexible structure that affects their ability to adapt to the specific situations presented by their respective environments. 
n314 
Principles of competitive equality dictate that the government should not force similarly situated firms into 
different regulatory modes. The differential costs imposed sap the ability of each firm to compete fairly in the 
marketplace. Although there might have been, and continue to be some rationale to treat the transportation industry (in 
fact only the railroads and airlines) differently from the rest of the economy, there does not appear to be any principled 
rationale to treat firms within the same industry, and that provide an identical service differently. In short, the 
government should take regulation out of the competitive equation. 
B. A New Approach to Labor Law Reform 
Heretofore, this article has focused on the justifiability of having Congress imposing differing costs on members of 
the same industry by forcing them into distinct regulatory regimes. The prior discussion articulates what those cost 
differences are, pointing out that they are non-trivial. The preceding section suggests that notions of fairness require a 
revision to the various statutory frameworks to correct this discrepancy. 
In this section I turn this question on its head. Instead of inquiring as to appropriateness of subjecting firms within 
the same industry to different labor relations regimes, I ask whether it will be proper for Congress to present the targets 
of regulation with a set of regulatory alternatives and let those affected by the regulation choose the regulatory 
framework that best fits their situation. The analysis here transcends the express delivery industry, and seeks to identify 
the contours of such a scheme. 
The analysis of the express package delivery industry demonstrates  [*999]  that at any time, any one regulatory 
regime is likely to fail to address the relevant concerns of those who are covered under the regulation. n315 Changes in 
technology, labor trends, and market conditions occur too quickly and with enough frequency, that not even the most 
efficient legislature is able to keep pace. Political sensitivities also make it difficult for Congress to enact legislation, 
exacerbating even more the problem of regulatory misfit. 
Despite these concerns, the traditional regulatory mode, at both the federal and state levels, has been to adopt one 
statutory framework that governs all members in an industry. n316 As an alternative, this article will suggest that 
instead of adopting one regulatory regime which is intended to cover every employer in a particular industry, Congress 
should adopt a menu of alternative rules regarding the regulation of the labor relations process, and let the stakeholders 
choose a set of rules that will govern their employment relationship. Congress could adopt some general principles 
regarding labor relations, akin to the current Section 7 of the NLRA which guarantees the right of individuals to choose 
to join or not to join and assist a labor organization. n317 Congress will then adopt (either directly or through the 
agency) a menu of alternative rules that the parties can then adopt on their own. 
The menu of rules adopted by Congress should be detailed enough, as to include regulations on the various 
components of the labor relations process: organizing, contract negotiations and contract administration. For example, 
Congress could adopt a set of rules regarding organizing, as now available under the three statutes, or create an entirely 
new set of choices. From the NLRA, Congress could incorporate the alternative of an appropriate bargaining unit. n318 
From the RLA, Congress could incorporate the option of bargaining units defined by craft or class lines. n319 Another 
set of options could be provided regarding the  [*1000]  ability of parties to obtain injunctions in federal court to enforce 
statutory rights, or to instead rely on administrative procedures. n320 Alternative rules will also be provided regarding 
issues of contract negotiation and contract administration. 
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Following issuance of the menu of rules, it will be then necessary for individual firms to adopt a set of rules that 
will govern their labor relations process. Obviously, at this point, and in the absence of any representation by 
employees, employers will be more likely to select a set of rules that result in the least interference with managerial 
rights as possible, and correspondingly, in possible minimal protection of employees’ rights. n321 To avoid this 
problem, Congress could mandate that the adoption of the regulatory framework by the firm, be conducted with the 
input from the employees to be affected by the choice of rules. If employees are currently represented by a labor 
organization, the process will be relatively straightforward, the current union will represent the employees in the 
negotiated rulemaking process. n322 If the employees are not represented by a labor organization, the employees could 
secure the advice of a labor union for these purposes, or for that matter, the advice of any other private group (e.g., law 
firm, community group). 
Once the selection of rules has been made, the employment relationship will be governed by the terms agreed in the 
negotiated rulemaking process. In the absence of an agreement on an alternative set of rules, the employment 
relationship will be regulated under the regulatory frameworks available under current law. In a sense, the current 
regulatory frameworks will serve as a default rule. 
Thus in a sense, I am suggesting a two stage bargaining process, the first stage being negotiation over the legal 
framework under which the parties are to operate and the second stage being negotiations over the terms and conditions 
of employment (as presently done). 
Although the rule-menu approach is radical as applied to the  [*1001]  regulation of labor relations, the idea of 
flexible regulation is hardly new in administrative law literature. Over the last decade there has been a significant 
amount of activity in the area of flexible regulation. n323 Flexible regulation refers to the use of collaborative 
regulatory approaches under which the firms, groups, and individuals who are the subject of regulatory compulsion 
(stakeholders) engage in designing and enforcing of the rules that dictate their conduct. n324 The basic premise of 
flexible regulation is that by empowering the stakeholders of regulation, society can achieve more efficient regulatory 
outcomes. n325 A number of approaches have been adopted on an experimental basis, primarily in the area of 
environmental regulation: negotiated rulemaking, n326 and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL. n327 
Three basic problems have been identified in the development of flexible regulation experiments: (1) the problem 
of adequate  [*1002]  group participation; (2) the capture problem; and (3) the continuity problem. 
Adequate public participation refers to identifying the proper groups that have a stake in the rule-making process 
and providing them with the access, resources, and expertise needed to make a meaningful contribution to the regulatory 
process. n328 Capture or cooption refers to the possibility that either the interest groups that are represented at the 
bargaining table will disregard the interest of other stakeholders that are not present, or that the leadership of the groups 
at the bargaining table will compromise the interests of their membership in exchange for some broader political gain. 
n329 Finally, the continuity problem arises due to the turnover that occurs in the membership of the groups participating 
in flexible regulation experiments. n330 
These problems are somewhat related. To see how they interact consider the following. Principles of fairness and 
openness suggest as broad participation as possible in the process of enacting a new rule. All groups and individuals 
with a stake in the regulatory issue should be able to participate in the process leading to the adoption of a new rule or 
standard. n331 Broader participation increases the availability of information and thus furthers the goal of creative and 
innovative decision-making. n332 Finally, broader participation diminishes the chances of cooption or capture, as it 
prevents “sweetheart” deals by allowing all possible interests to be represented at the bargaining table. n333 
Opening the door to every imaginable stakeholder, however, raises in turn some practical problems. For example, 
broad participation will make the negotiation process too lengthy and thus limit the efficiency gains of a flexible 
approach as compared to traditional rulemaking. n334 Broad participation will also allow fringe groups to highjack the 
process by introducing extreme demands. n335 
Another problem relates to the likelihood that local groups  [*1003]  will dominate the negotiation process. n336 
On the one hand, this tendency, if it materializes, is not a drawback on itself. Local groups are likely to have better 
idiosyncratic knowledge, and a greater sense of commitment to solving the problem. n337 On the other hand, local 
groups are likely to have more extreme views, and might lack the expertise to engage in meaningful negotiations with 
the opposing side and with the agency. n338 
The third problem, lack of continuity, presents another impediment in the use of flexible regulation. A key 
component of flexible regulation is the presumption that following the adoption of the new rules or standards, there will 
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not be any challenges to the legitimacy of the adopted framework. n339 The parties that participated in the adoption 
process are expected to continue to be committed to the framework they negotiated, and thus not to challenge the 
framework’s legitimacy. n340 However, fringe groups that did not participate are likely to disrupt the process by 
challenging its legitimacy. n341 
It has been suggested that for flexible regulation to work (that is, to adequately deal with the problems of group 
inclusion, cooption and continuity) three conditions have to be satisfied: (1) stakeholders can be divided into discrete 
groups with clearly identifiable regulatory interests; (2) stakeholders maintain an ongoing relationship with the owner of 
the regulated facility; and (3) stakeholders have access to expertise and resources to properly negotiate with other 
interested groups. n342 
Are these three conditions likely to materialize in the labor relations area, were we to adopt a flexible regulation 
approach? This section concludes by suggesting that all of these three conditions could be satisfied given the 
institutional dimensions of the labor relations process. 
First, unlike negotiated rulemaking, the rules-menu approach will only be applicable to a particular firm. 
Accordingly, it is very easy to identify the groups with a stake in the adoption of a regulatory framework: the employer 
and the current employees.  [*1004]  Further, the presence of labor organizations substantially facilitates the 
implementation of flexible regulation. Local labor organizations are primarily responsive to the interests of the members 
they represent. However, since they are affiliated with a national organization, which in turn is most likely affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO, extreme local interests are properly constrained. 
Second, labor organizations are also likely to provide some of the continuity that has been lacking under negotiated 
rulemaking and even under Project XL. The ongoing relationship, however, raises concerns regarding cooption of group 
leaders. Overall, however, concerns with cooption are maybe less likely in this context. Although the labor movement in 
the United States has experienced its share of scandals and dubious dealings, there is very little doubt that unions are 
independent organizations, unlikely to be coopted by the employer. 
Finally, the affiliation between local and national unions will provide the locals with the necessary resources, 
expertise, and information to properly negotiate with employers over the adoption of the regulatory framework. 
Overall, the approach outlined here is amenable to the aim of flexible regulation: empowering the groups and 
individuals that are the subject of the regulatory regime. By allowing employers and employees to, in effect, define the 
details of their rights and obligations in regard to the labor relations process the rules-menu approach will allow the 
parties to tailor the regulation to the needs and idiosyncrasies of a particular industry and even a particular firm. This 
flexibility could be accomplished without compromising the protections currently afforded employees under the various 
statutes. Employees will have the same voice as the employer in choosing the appropriate set of rules that will govern 
their employment rights. 
Conclusion 
The express package delivery industry provides us with a unique research opportunity of exploring the impact that 
regulation has on the ability of firms to compete within a single industry. This Article takes advantage of that 
opportunity. By comparing the three regulatory regimes regarding labor relations in the express package delivery 
industry, the Article contributes to our understanding of the competitive effects of regulation.  [*1005]  The Article 
analyzes the cost implications of having firms within the same industry subject to different labor laws, and identifies the 
inequities that result from the current frameworks applicable to the express delivery industry. 
The Article then turns this weakness into a possible strength by outlining the contours of a new labor law regulatory 
framework in which firms and employees are allowed to choose the set of labor regulations that will govern their 
relationship. In the spirit of new experiments with flexible regulation, the framework introduced here relies on the input 





n1. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 21-33 (1991) 
(reviewing the history of the economic theory of regulation); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
21 
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 371 (1983) (describing the legislative process as a system in which 
“actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests”).  
n2. See Stephen P. Magee, Endogenous Protection: The Empirical Evidence, in Perspectives on Public Choice: A 
Handbook 526, 526-27 (Dennis G. Mueller ed., 1997) (describing a tariff as the result of the political bargaining among 
interest groups).  
n3. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and 
Margarine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 83, 105-118 (1989) (analyzing the dairy industry from the public choice perspective).  
n4. See Magee, supra note 2, at 527.  
n5. See Miller, supra note 3, at 130.  
n6. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 1, at 21-31.  
n7. See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 33-36 (1965) 
(describing the formation of interest groups).  
n8. The express package industry refers to firms competing in the package delivery service such as the U.S. Postal 
Service (USPS), United Parcel Service (UPS), Federal Express, DHL, Airborne Express, Emery Worldwide, and 
Purolator. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.  
n9. 39 U.S.C. 101-5605 (1994).  
n10. 29 U.S.C. 157-187 (1994).  
n11. 45 U.S.C. 151-163 (1994).  
n12. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.  
n13. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.  
n14. See infra notes 36-188 and accompanying text.  
n15. See infra notes 189-307 and accompanying text.  
n16. See infra notes 308-42 and accompanying text.  
n17. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.  
n18. See Leonard Bierman, Towards a New Model for Union Organizing: The Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 
28 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 20-23 (1985) (discussing the failed attempts to reform labor law in the 1970s).  
n19. See infra notes 315-42 and accompanying text.  
n20. Id.  
n21. See, e.g., In re UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995).  
n22. See http://www.usps.gov (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n23. See http://www.ups.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n24. See http://www.fedex.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n25. See http://www.airborne.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n26. See http://www.purolator.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n27. See http://www.dhl-usa.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n28. See http://emeryworldwide.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (containing general company information).  
n29. See, e.g., UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the various delivery components of 
UPS’s operations); In re Emery Worldwide Airlines, 28 N.M.B. 355, 357 (2001) (describing the operations of Emery 
Worldwide); In re UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995) (describing the mix of ground and air operations of UPS); In re Fed. 
Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. 32, 36-47 (1995) (describing the operations of Federal Express); In re DHL Corp., 260 
N.L.R.B. 17 (1982) (describing the operations of DHL).  
22 
n30. UPS, 318 N.L.R.B. at 778 (ninety-two percent of the packages processed by UPS travel exclusively by 
ground).  
n31. In re Emery Worldwide Airlines, 28 N.M.B. 216, 236 (2001).  
n32. Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. at 36-47.  
n33. Firms with a larger proportion of air to ground transport have been regulated under the RLA as opposed to the 
NLRA. See, e.g., UPS v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Fed. Express Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 871 (1997).  
n34. See Lorraine M. Cote & William M. Takis, The Future of the U.S. Postal Service: An Assessment of Options, 
in Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries 342, 342-43 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 
1997) (describing the competitive forces faced by the USPS).  
n35. See, e.g., Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery Services 
(1996). Transportation and Distribution, an industry magazine, commonly features articles about industry developments 
affecting UPS, Federal Express, and other similar carriers.  
n36. 29 U.S.C. 157-187 (1994).  
n37. 45 U.S.C. 151-163 (1994).  
n38. 39 U.S.C. 101-5605 (1994).  
n39. Because the PRA resembles the NLRA in most respects, this part contrasts the NLRA (and hence PRA) with 
the RLA, saving a discussion about the PRA to the end.  
n40. See Dana Eischen, Representation Disputes and Their Resolution in the Railroad and Airline Industries, in The 
Railway Labor Act at Fifty 1, 23-25 (Charles Rehmus ed., 1977).  
n41. For example, the federal government operated the nation’s railways during the World War I effort, and 
intervened in the operations of national railroads during the 1894 Pullman strike and the 1916 eight-hour dispute. See 
Dennis A. Arouca & Henry H. Perritt Jr., Transportation Labor Regulation: Is the Railway Labor Act or the National 
Labor Relations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle?, 3 Lab. L.J. 145, 148-49 (1985).  
n42. Compare the Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501, 501-504 (1888); the Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 
370, 30 Stat. 424, 424-428 (1898); the Newlands Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103, 103-106 (1913) (current version at 45 
U.S.C. 101-125 (1994)); and the Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721-722 (1916).  
n43. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41 at 149.  
n44. See 45 U.S.C. 152 para. 10, 157 para. 3, para. 9, para. 10; see also Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. 
Union, 402 U.S. 570, 590-91 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
n45. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150.  
n46. Id.  
n47. 48 Stat. 195 (1933).  
n48. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150.  
n49. Id.  
n50. See Murray B. Nesbitt, Labor Relations in the Federal Govern-ment Service 386-90 (1976) (describing the 
origins of the Postal Reorganization Act).  
n51. Id. at 386.  
n52. Id. at 387-88.  
n53. Id. at 388.  
n54. Id. at 386-90.  
n55. Id.  
n56. 39 U.S.C. 1203 (1994).  
23 
n57. Id. 1207.  
n58. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150-51.  
n59. 29 U.S.C. 153-156 (1994).  
n60. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150-51.  
n61. Id.  
n62. Id.  
n63. Paradoxically, the NMB plays a much more active role in particular areas of industrial relations. In 
representation disputes, the NMB mandates details, such as use of election ballots as remedies. See infra notes 86-95 
and accompanying text. In interest disputes, the NMB exercises far more control over certain aspects of bargaining 
structure, including the timing of strikes, than the NLRB. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text. Also under the 
RLA, governmental, rather than contractual, entities superintend railroad grievance disputes. See infra notes 114-28 and 
accompanying text.  
n64. 29 U.S.C. 158 (1994).  
n65. Id. 157.  
n66. Section 158(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to: 
(1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it ...; (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization ...; (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has 
filed charges or given testimony under this Act; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a). 
Id. 158(a).  
n67. Section 158(b) makes it a ULP for labor organizations to: 
(1) restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ...; (B) an 
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the 
adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an 
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to 
whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his 
failure to tender the periodic dues; (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer . . ; (5) to 
negotiate “closed shop” provisions; (6) to negotiate “featherbedding” provisions; and (7) to engage in 
organizational and recognitional picketing under certain circumstances. 
Id. 158(b). Section 158(e) outlaws “hot cargo” provisions. Id. 158(e).  
n68. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151; cf. Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act - Time for 
Repeal? 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 441, 503-504 (1990) (arguing that the availability of the ULP mechanism has not 
played a major role in the development of labor policy).  
n69. Northrup, supra note 68, at 503-04.  
n70. Id. at 478-502.  
n71. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 152.  
n72. Id.  
n73. 45 U.S.C. 151(a) (1994). As originally enacted in 1926, the RLA did not establish procedures for resolving 
representation disputes. Amendments in 1934 and 1936 authorized the NMB to determine the employees’ choice of 
representatives in the railroad industry and extended this authority to resolve disputes in the airline industry. See 
Eischen, supra note 40, at 23-69.  
n74. 45 U.S.C. 152 para. 3 (1994).  
n75. 29 U.S.C. 157 (1994).  
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n76. To be sure, the two statutes differ in other aspects of the representation process. For example, the NLRA, in 
contrast to the RLA, permits recognitional picketing under certain conditions for a period of up to thirty days. Id. 
158(b)(7)(c). Under the RLA, however, unions are allowed to exercise secondary pressure. See infra notes 298-305 and 
accompanying text.  
n77. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).  
n78. 45 U.S.C. 152 paras. 3-4 (1994).  
n79. See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA and the 
RLA, 2 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J., 317, 334 (1998).  
n80. 29 U.S.C. 160(j) (1994).  
n81. See Morris, supra note 79, at 334.  
n82. Id.  
n83. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 496.  
n84. The NMB, however, will certify a union only when more than fifty percent of those eligible vote. Id.  
n85. Id. The NLRB certifies on the basis of a majority of those voting, even if less than fifty percent of the eligible 
employees participate in the election. Thus, although the NLRB certifies election results only on the basis of those 
voting (therefore making it possible that a union might be certified without more than fifty percent of eligible 
employees voting), it encourages participation in the election by giving those employees who oppose union 
representation the alternative to vote “no union.” Id.  
n86. See Ronald C. Henson & Michael J. Gaugh, Carrier Election Campaigns, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 
Materials, Vol. I, No. SD50, 81, 99 (1999).  
n87. Id.  
n88. In re Laker Airways, Ltd., 8 N.M.B. 236 (1981).  
n89. For example in Key Airlines the carrier’s activities included denying a scheduled pay increase to employees in 
one craft or class immediately after a representation application was filed, holding meetings for the express purpose of 
discouraging organization and threatening employees’ job security should they vote for representation. The carrier also 
issued a letter criticizing the organization (International Brotherhood of Teamsters) that included comments such as: 
“[do] you want to be a partner with an organization that has such a sordid reputation as the Teamsters.” In re Key 
Airlines, 16 N.M.B. 296, 303 (1989).  
n90. Id. at 296.  
n91. 45 U.S.C. 152 para. 9 (1994).  
n92. For example, the NMB placed all clerical employees, freight handlers, and station and store employees into 
one bargaining unit, apparently because this bargaining unit has been previously organized by the Brotherhood of 
Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers and Station and Store Employees. See Eischen, supra note 40, at 58-
68.  
n93. In re Ground Servs., Inc., 8 N.M.B. 35 (1980); In re Union Pac. R.R., 8 N.M.B. 127 (1981).  
n94. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 162.  
n95. U.N.A. Chapter, Flight Eng’rs’ Int’l Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 294 F.2d 905, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1961).  
n96. 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1994). Under the NLRA, the primary focus in determining an appropriate bargaining unit is 
that employees with a community of interest should be grouped together. The NLRB inquires into a number of factors 
to test the community of interest: extent and type of union organization; bargaining history for the employees involved 
and in the particular industry at issue; similarity of duties, skills, interests, and working conditions; and structure of the 
company, and employee desires. See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va. L. Rev. 353, 383 (1984).  
n97. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 162.  
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n98. The RLA also provides a greater degree of protection for maintaining a union’s bargaining representative 
status. In contrast to the NLRA, which specifically allows for a decertification process, the RLA does not include any 
such procedure. 29 U.S.C. 159 (c)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). The lack of a formal decertification process is further evidence of 
the favorable disposition to union organizing under the RLA, as compared to the NLRA.  
n99. 45 U.S.C. 152 para. 1 (1994). The process of collective bargaining is defined to include: (1) a written notice 
thirty days before an intended change of an agreement; (2) a time and place to meet must be agreed upon within ten 
days after receipt of such notice, and the meeting must occur within thirty days as provided in the notice; and (3) 
prohibition of unilateral changes in contracts and of strikes and lockouts during this procedure and the intervention that 
ensues. 45 U.S.C. 152 paras. 6-7, 156 (1994).  
n100. 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1994).  
n101. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).  
n102. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor Act and the Era of 
Deregulation, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1485, 1495 (1990).  
n103. Various other differences exist. For example, under the RLA, the statute itself imposes an obligation not to 
strike over interest (major) disputes or rights (minor) disputes until the statutory dispute resolution processes have been 
exhausted. 45 U.S.C. 152 para. 1 (1994). Under the NLRA, any obligation not to strike is primarily contractual. See Van 
Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1496. In addition, unlike collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA, 
agreements under the RLA do not have an expiration date. Periodic requests for changes in specific wage rates or rules 
are made by filing a statutory notice of intent to change the existing agreement under section 6 of the RLA. 45 U.S.C. 
156 (1994). As a result, agreements in the railroad industry include provisions that are decades old, as well as recently 
negotiated provisions. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1495. The NLRA, on the other hand, gives statutory 
approval to agreements for a fixed term. Under the NLRA a party desiring to change the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement must give sixty days advance notice to the opposing side. If the agreement is for a fixed term, the 
sixty-day notice is not effective until sixty days prior to the date the agreement may be modified or terminated. 29 
U.S.C. 158(d) (1994).  
n104. Id.  
n105. For example, in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court held 
that a company has no duty to bargain over a decision to close a part of its business. The Court justified this limitation 
on the scope of bargaining by defining certain areas as domains of exclusive management prerogative. Id.  
n106. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).  
n107. First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 683-85.  
n108. Id. (finding no duty to bargain over decision to shut down part of a business); cf. In re Dubuque Packing Co. 
(II), 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 390-92 (1991) (announcing a new test to determine whether an employer’s decisions to relocate 
bargaining units work is a mandatory subject).  
n109. 45 U.S.C. 152 paras. 1-2 (1994).  
n110. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1527.  
n111. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 338 (1960). The Supreme Court 
continued to adhere to the view of defining the duty to bargain broadly under the RLA, at least until 1989. In that year 
the Court issued a decision that challenges the broad construction of the duty to bargain. In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490, 503-04 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the 
employer did not have an obligation to bargain over a decision to sell its assets. According to the Court, such a decision 
was a management prerogative, and not a subject about which section 6 bargaining could be required. The Court stated 
that 
the decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management prerogative that only an 
unmistakable expression of congressional intent will suffice to require the employer to postpone a sale 
of its assets pending the fulfillment of any duty it may have to bargain over the subject matter of 
union notices such as were served in this litigation. Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the 
decision of a railroad employer to go out of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number 
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of available jobs is not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo 
provisions of [section 6]. 
Id. at 509. 
Although this language appears to incorporate the NLRA’s mandatory-permissive distinction, there is language in 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie that seemingly limits the Court’s decision. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1535.  
n112. United Indus. Workers v. Bd. of Trs. of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).  
n113. Ruby v. TACA Int’l Airlines, 439 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1971).  
n114. A minor dispute “relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision [of a collective 
agreement] with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.” Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 
711, 713 (1945), aff’d on reh’g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); see also Jonathan Cohen & James Lobsenz, Grievance Resolution 
and the System Board of Adjustment, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials, Vol. I, No. SD50, 357 (1999).  
n115. These include the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Special Boards of Adjustment, and the Public 
Law Boards. Id. at 381, 390-94.  
n116. 45 U.S.C. 153 para. 1 (1994). The NRAB is formed of four independent divisions, each having jurisdiction 
over particular crafts. Id. 153(h). The First Division has jurisdiction over disputes involving “engineers, firemen, 
hostlers, and outside hostler helpers, conductors, trainmen and yard-service employees.” Id. The Second Division has 
jurisdiction over the “shop craft” employees. Id. The Third Division has jurisdiction over disputes involving clerical, 
maintenance-of-way, signal, and dispatcher forces. Id. The Fourth Division considers disputes involving water 
transportation employees and any other employees who are not covered by the first three divisions. Id. Each division 
has an equal number of management and union representatives. Recently, the NRAB has handled about fifteen percent 
of railroad grievances. Nat’l Mediation Bd., Fifty-Nine, Sixtieth and Sixty-First Annual Reports 39 (1995).  
n117. 45 U.S.C. 153 para. 2 (1994). The SBAs operate at the system, group, or regional level, to resolve minor 
disputes otherwise referable to the NRAB.  
n118. See Joshua M. Javits, Grievance Procedures: The Carrier’s Perspective, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 
Materials, Vol. I, No. SD50, 81, 99 (1999). PLBs and SBAs do not provide for individual employee processing of 
grievances. SBAs require that both parties consent to the submission of the dispute, but, either party can request in 
writing that the dispute proceed before a PLB. The NMB estimates that approximately twenty-eight percent of the 
grievances referred to it are handled by SBAs and sixty percent are handled by PLBs. Id. at 392.  
n119. 45 U.S.C. 184 (1994).  
n120. See Javits, supra note 118, at 383.  
n121. Id. at 384.  
n122. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 474.  
n123. See Nat’l Mediation Bd., supra note 116, at 40.  
n124. Id.  
n125. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 474.  
n126. Since 1992, the number of cases received under section 153 has decreased significantly, as has the backlog of 
cases. According to NMB statistics, in 1992 the number of railroad arbitration cases pending was 11,736. In 1995, the 
number decreased to 9,661. See Nat’l Mediation Bd., supra note 116, at 24. The NMB attributes this reduction to a 
number of administrative measures taken over the last few years. For example, the NMB now requires the parties to 
provide a case number and a subject code identifying the issue for each case pending under section 153. This 
requirement forces the parties to look at each case and determine at the earliest possible stage if the case has become 
moot, has settled, or has been abandoned. More recently, the NMB has also been a proponent of expedited boards.  
n127. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 478.  
n128. Id.  
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n129. See Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in Workplace Dispute 
Resolution 17 (Sandra Gleason ed., 1997).  
n130. See David Lewin, Theoretical and Empirical Research on the Grievance Procedure and Arbitration: A 
Critical Review, in Employment Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace 137, 145-58 
(Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999).  
n131. The success of the voluntary approach to grievance resolution under the NLRA has been due in part to the 
strong support the grievance arbitration process has received from the Supreme Court. In 1960 the Supreme Court 
decided three cases (“the Steelworkers Trilogy”) setting the ground rules for the relationship between the judiciary and 
the arbitration process. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593 (1960). Taken together, the three opinions show a clear judicial decision to support the voluntary process 
of grievance arbitration by putting the force of law behind it. The decisions are highly deferential to arbitration 
agreements entered into by labor and management and to the decisions of arbitrators pursuant to such agreements. See 
Douglas E. Ray et al., Under-standing Labor Law 342-45 (1999). Under the Steelworkers Trilogy, courts should enforce 
a contractual promise to arbitrate (Am. Mfg. Co.); and should use a presumption of arbitrability in determining whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate a type or class of dispute (Gulf Navigation Co.). Courts finding arbitrability should order 
arbitration without inquiring into the merits of the underlying grievance, and when reviewing the award itself, should 
enforce the awards so long as it can be said to have “drawn its essence” from the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement (Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.).  
n132. See Lewin, supra note 130, at 145.  
n133. See Feuille, supra note 129, at 32.  
n134. Id. at 33.  
n135. 45 U.S.C. 151(a) (1994).  
n136. Id.  
n137. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969).  
n138. 45 U.S.C. 153 (1994).  
n139. Id.  
n140. Id. 152 para. 2.  
n141. Id. 155 para. 1.  
n142. 29 C.F.R. 1203.1 (1990).  
n143. 45 U.S.C. 155 para. 1(b) (1994).  
n144. 45 U.S.C. 160 (1994). This section requires emergency boards to present their findings to the President 
within thirty days after their appointment and prohibits the parties to the dispute from changing the status quo (except 
by agreement) during the board’s deliberations and for thirty days thereafter. Id. The courts have construed this 
language to prohibit strikes. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969).  
n145. 45 U.S.C. 156 (1994).  
n146. Because the status quo provisions of the RLA enable unions to delay implementation of strategic-level 
corporate decisions, carriers frequently contend that their contested decisions or unilateral actions are not governed by 
the Act’s status quo provisions at all. Rather, they often claim that a dispute is subject to a different dispute-resolution 
mechanism in the Act, the grievance and arbitration procedures. Such arguments have not received sanction from 
courts. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 102, at 1500.  
n147. See Nat’l Medication Bd., Frequency of Presidential Emergency Boards in Railroad and Airline Collective 
Bargaining Disputes under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 1934-1999, at http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/pebchart34-
01.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).  
n148. See Charles Rehmus, Emergency Strikes Revisited, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 175, 177 (1990).  
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n149. Beginning with the Nixon Administration, the White House has been reluctant to appoint emergency boards 
as a matter of course, believing that such routine appointments inappropriately interfere with free collective bargaining. 
Figures are taken from the National Mediation Board Annual Report for various years.  
n150. See Rehmus, supra note 148 at 177.  
n151. Only one Airline PEB was established under RLA procedures over the past thirty-three years. Since the mid-
1960s, governmental policy has discouraged the use of PEBs in airline labor-management disputes. The emergency 
board established in the American Airlines-Allied Pilots Association dispute (P.E.B. No. 233) on March 19, 1997, was 
an exception to this long-standing policy. 
Two other trends are worth mentioning regarding the appointment of emergency boards. First, the vast majority of 
emergency boards have been appointed to deal with disputes involving publicly owned commuter rail operations. See 
Rehmus, supra note 148, at 180. Because the RLA allows for the creation of an emergency board if “any section” of the 
nation is deprived of essential transportation services, the “national” character of these emergencies is highly 
questionable. Id. Second, since 1963 when President Kennedy sent to Congress a dispute involving the National 
Railway Labor Conference and the five operating brotherhoods and in which Congress intervened by creating a 
compulsory arbitration board, congressional action to resolve rail labor disputes has been fairly common. Id. at 182-87. 
In its 1994 report on the future of worker-management relations, the Dunlop Commission noted that out of the 
seventeen times that Congress has had to intervene in rail disputes, five occurred between 1990 and 1994. See Fact 
Finding Report: Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 98-103 (1994).  
n152. 29 U.S.C. 163 (1994).  
n153. Section 158(d) requires sixty days advance notice of a party’s desire to change the terms of the agreement. If 
the agreement is for a fixed term, however, the sixty-day notice of desire to change the agreement is not effective until 
sixty days prior to the date the agreement may be modified or terminated. 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1994). Economic action 
that occurs before that time has expired is an unfair labor practice, and the employees who take such action lose their 
statutory rights. Section 158(d), however, does not delay economic action over matters not covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, and not otherwise disposed of in negotiations, until the end of the contract term. Only a sixty-day 
notice is necessary as to those issues.  
n154. For example, through the use of “zipper clauses,” In re Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362, 363-64 (1974), 
and arbitration clauses, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the parties can regulate the 
scope and timing of economic pressure.  
n155. 29 U.S.C. 141-197 (1994).  
n156. Id. 176.  
n157. Id.  
n158. Id. 178.  
n159. Id. 179.  
n160. Id.  
n161. Id. 180.  
n162. 361 U.S. 39 (1959). Steelworkers arose out of a nationwide steel strike, which began on July 5, 1959. 
President Truman invoked the Taft-Hartley procedure on October 9, and the district court granted an injunction on 
October 21. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court decided the case in a short, per curiam opinion 
due to the necessity for prompt adjudication. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan subsequently wrote a more complete 
concurring opinion filed December 7, 1959.  
n163. Id. at 42.  
n164. Id.  
n165. Id.  
n166. 335 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1971).  
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n167. Id. at 505; see also United States v. Portland Longshoremen’s Benevolent Soc’y Local 861, 336 F. Supp. 
504, 505 (D. Me. 1971) (granting Taft-Hartley injunction in similar strike and criticizing Illinois court for examining 
only events occurring within its jurisdiction).  
n168. See John A. Ackermann, The Impact of the Coal Strike of 1977-78, 32 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 175, 187 
(1979).  
n169. See Rehmus, supra note 148, at 176-78.  
n170. 39 U.S.C. 1201-1207 (1994).  
n171. Id. 1203.  
n172. Id. 1206(b).  
n173. Id. 1203.  
n174. Id. 1202.  
n175. Id. 1207.  
n176. Id. 1207(a).  
n177. Id.  
n178. Id. 1207(b).  
n179. Id.  
n180. Id. 1207(c).  
n181. See Michael Wachter & Jeffrey Perloff, A Comparative Analysis of Wage Premiums and Industrial Relations 
in the British Post Office and the United States Postal Service, in Competition and Innovation in Postal Services 36 
(Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1991).  
n182. Id.  
n183. See Postal Service, Four Unions Fail to Reach Pact, Invoking Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. News, Nov. 23, 
1990, at A-2.  
n184. Id.  
n185. See New Postal Service Contract Includes Modest Wage Increases, Daily Lab. Rep. News, June 13, 1991, at 
A-3.  
n186. Id.  
n187. See Louis C. LaBrecque, Postal Workers: Arbitration Panel Settles Contract Dispute with NALC; Award 
Includes Higher Pay Scale, Daily Lab. Rep. News, Sept. 21, 1999, at A-2.  
n188. Id.  
n189. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.  
n190. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.  
n191. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.  
n192. Id.  
n193. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 149.  
n194. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.  
n195. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 150.  
n196. Id.  
n197. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.  
30 
n198. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.  
n199. Id.  
n200. Id.  
n201. See Thomas A. Kochan & Harry C. Katz, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations 438-41 (1988) 
(discussing the political dimension of the employer (government) in the public sector context).  
n202. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Transformative Mediation?, 18 
Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L.J. 367 (2001).  
n203. Id.  
n204. For example, in 1997 the number of ULPs per 10,000 employees in the trucking industry was 11.3, while for 
postal employees the number was thirty-nine ULPs per 10,000 employees. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Annual 
Report (1998).  
n205. 29 U.S.C. 158 (1994).  
n206. Id. 158(a)(1).  
n207. Id. 158(a)(2).  
n208. Id. 158(a)(5).  
n209. Id. 158(b)(1).  
n210. Id. 158(b)(4).  
n211. Id. 158(b)(3).  
n212. Id. 159(9).  
n213. Id. 160.  
n214. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151.  
n215. Id.  
n216. See Laura J. Cooper et al., ADR in the Workplace: A Coursebook 500-02 (2000) (comparing the costs of 
arbitration and litigation in a judicial forum). The NLRB may defer to the grievance procedure if the contractual 
procedure is capable of adequately solving the dispute. In re Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). This 
practice will tend to reduce the costs of enforcing statutory rights.  
n217. See Cooper et al., supra note 216, at 500-02.  
n218. Id.  
n219. Id.  
n220. These figures are taken from the 1997 Annual Report of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and 
thus they do not include arbitration procedures under the RLA. Anecdotal experience suggests that the resolution of 
grievances takes substantially longer under the RLA than under the NLRA. Some commentators indicate than on 
average it takes years to resolve grievances that are submitted to one of the boards. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 475. 
There does not appear to be, however, any verifiable data on this regard.  
n221. See Morris, supra note 79, at 338.  
n222. See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1772-73 (1983) (discussing the strategic use by employers of the NLRA).  
n223. Id.  
n224. 452 U.S. 666 (1980).  
n225. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
n226. See Stone, supra note 102, at 1527.  
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n227. Id.  
n228. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.  
n229. Id.  
n230. Employees have primarily relied on the injunctive power of the federal district courts to enforce statutory 
rights under the RLA. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); see also 
Morris, supra note 79, at 335.  
n231. Id.  
n232. Arcamuzi v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1987).  
n233. See Morris, supra note 79, at 322 tbl.1.  
n234. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.  
n235. See Eischen, supra note 40, at 32-34.  
n236. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.  
n237. Id.  
n238. Id.  
n239. Id.  
n240. See Northrup, supra note 68, at 479.  
n241. Id.  
n242. In 1990, the NLRB for the first time since its creation promulgated a substantive rule defining the employee 
units appropriate for collective bargaining in a particular line of commerce: acute care hospitals. 29 C.F.R. 103.30 
(1990).  
n243. See Arouca & Perritt, supra note 41, at 151.  
n244. Id.  
n245. The figures are calculated using the annual reports of the NLRB and NMB for the respective years.  
n246. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., supra note 204.  
n247. See generally David Lewin and R.B. Peterson, The Modern Grievance Procedure in the United States (1988).  
n248. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.  
n249. As described earlier, the grievance process in the airline industry is financed by the parties themselves. Thus, 
while the cost savings will be smaller, resort to the grievance process will be more sporadic.  
n250. See Javits, supra note 118, at 394.  
n251. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.  
n252. See Javits, supra note 118, at 394.  
n253. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988).  
n254. In addition, because of the use of larger, carrier-wide bargaining units under the RLA, an employer can 
bargain for efficiencies in the grievance arbitration process that cannot be attained under the NLRA, given the use of 
smaller bargaining units.  
n255. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.  
n256. Id.  
n257. See Stephen I. Schlossberg & Judith A. Scott, Organizing and the Law 204-06 (1983) (discussing the 
strategic considerations of the bargaining unit determination).  
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n258. As compared to unionization rates in the United States as a whole, unionization rates in the railroad and 
airline industries have remained unusually strong. See Morris, supra note 79, at 319-20. From 1955 to the 1990s the 
percent of non-agricultural workers represented by labor organizations has dropped from thirty-three percent to its 
present level of about 14.1%. Id. In industries covered by the RLA, however, between eighty percent and eighty-five 
percent of railroad employees were represented by unions in 1996, and sixty-five percent to seventy percent for 
employees of the scheduled airlines in 1997. Id. Thus, union density in the industries covered by the RLA actually has 
been increasing. Id.  
n259. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.  
n260. See Schlossberg & Scott, supra note 257, at 204-06.  
n261. Id.  
n262. Id.  
n263. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.  
n264. Id.  
n265. See generally Labor Law and Business Change: Theoretical and Transactional Perspectives (Samuel 
Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988) (developing a model of the duty to bargain under the NLRA).  
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